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Once upon a time 
there was… Europe
Abdelkader Benali
So how far are we in the story? Are 
we dangling close to the cliffhanger? 
Are we Icarus or are we Don Quixote? 
Are we as desperate and heartbroken 
as Hamlet or are we more like a Dante 
shuffling through the underworld 
towards the light?
Foreword Abdelkader Benali
8Once upon a time there was… Europe
Once upon a time there was… Europe, but not as we had dreamt it. 
A Europe not of the massive cathedrals whose spires reach to the 
heavens. Nor the Europe of the sleeping Vesuvius who looks out across 
the Via Dante in Naples, that long, winding street which disappears deep 
into the body of the city like a gut. Nor the Europe of the searing heat in 
Seville, where in the Library of the New World the descriptions of Ibero-
American cultures lie waiting for readers. This is not the Europe I find in 
the Saturday supplements of the newspapers, where it is chiefly about 
the money and seldom about the choice bits. To complement the lack of 
orientation there is old-fashioned mud-slinging: the North has 
haughtiness hurled at it; the South is accused of suicidal insouciance. 
With a sigh I shove the newspapers away from me. Where is that wonder 
of the Romantic poets for the miracle from beyond the Alps. Kennst du 
das Land, wo die Zitronen blühn? – “Knowest thou the land where the 
lemon blossom grows?” And where are the southerners who want to 
leap over the barricades of the temperament? 
The dizzying European cultural mosaic is probably overly complex, 
too profuse in impressions and too manifold to serve as a blueprint for 
the political Europe that seems to be searching for an unambiguous, 
straightforward story. Haste is of the essence, because people feel that 
Europe will be a dead letter without a grand narrative. Europe, continent 
of Houdinis. So how far are we in the story? Are we dangling close to the 
cliffhanger? Are we Icarus or are we Don Quixote? Are we as desperate 
and heartbroken as Hamlet or are we more like a Dante shuffling 
through the underworld towards the light? Or, like Madame Bovary, are 
we dreaming of real life while not daring to put anything into it. Europe, 
tell me!
It is strange, however, that not so long ago the European states were 
9holding one another in a suffocating stranglehold that cost the lives of 
tens of millions of citizens. Having been so cruelly awoken from their 
perverse power trips, these same countries displayed a remarkably 
idealistic sense of reality to ensure that this total meltdown would never 
happen again. What we are now experiencing at the European level is an 
unflagging spin-off of that utopian thinking immediately after the 
Second World War. We are the children of a dream. When I learnt about 
Schuman and Monnet, it was from the economic perspective. Their 
European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was focused on making the 
joint economies dependent on one another by way of cooperation rather 
than conflict and it simultaneously promoted the establishment of a 
new order, in which values and norms as well as culture and nature 
were shared. Here, albeit in a highly bureaucratic manner, the challenge 
was taken up in order to see how boundlessly people could think within 
the boundaries of the bounded. And only because this occurred on the 
smouldering ruins of the great war and people were too busy with their 
own lives to focus on the big story, the radicalism of this new thinking 
was hidden from view. Moreover, did anyone still have an appetite for a 
grand narrative after the two world wars? After a millennium and a half 
of European history during which identity was defined by strife and 
conflict, it marked a complete change of course: in Europe shared values 
had to be rendered so robust that they could withstand war and any 
other crisis.
This idea is currently being put to the test in Athens, in Rome, in 
Madrid, in Paris, Berlin, Brussels and Amsterdam. What we are currently 
witnessing is the litmus test to see whether this narrative can bear it, to 
determine whether the story can be continued.
And because it is all so young and fresh, it is impossible to say where 
this story will end; it is a story not yet finished. 
Is it not true that every narrative is the accumulation of past events 
and only comes into being when we can articulate what we are dealing 
with, namely the story, that actually comprises a well-rounded whole? 
And at this juncture, in a Europe that is blossoming, is growing, weakens 
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here and there, catches its breath and pushes onward, is it simply too 
early to determine what kind of story it is because we are still in the 
middle of that tumultuous tale? All that we can say is that there were 
founding fathers who saw Europe as an autonomous union 
interconnected by all kinds of little micro-stories, rather than as a 
collection of entities. I think it all boils down to telling those micro-
stories large, like Scheherazade expanding lavishly upon a little story 
every evening in the hope that in a thousand and one nights, when she 
has nothing more to tell, her life might be spared.
Would you ask Alice whether she already knows what kind of story 
she is figuring in as she wanders through Wonderland in the midst of 
that story? That is what it is like with Europe now: its narrative is still a 
great unknown, because it is taking shape right under our noses. At best 
we can say that the story is unfinished so it cannot be written down yet, 
however masterly the master-hand that dares to venture such a task. So 
exercise patience and curiosity, let the imagination do the work. Don’t 
despair and keep on scratching where it itches.
Abdelkader Benali is one of the most prominent writers of the Netherlands. 
His debut novel Bruiloft aan zee (‘Wedding at Sea’, 1996) has been translated 
into many languages. He received the prestigious Libris prize for literature for 
his second novel, De Langverwachte (‘The Long-Awaited’, 2002). As well as 
writing novels and plays, Benali publishes regularly in Dutch and international 
newspapers and magazines. He has been contributing to ECF’s Narratives for 








Ovarian Lottery (Birth of Osvald)
 
In the first chapter of the Rise and Fall of Osvald, we are introduced 
to the fluid character of our European hero.
Siebe de Boer






Continent of Broken 
Dreams?
Odile Chenal
Aren’t there any new narratives 
inspiring the young generations of 
Europeans, within and beyond the EU, 
at the beginning of the 21st century? 
And if there are any, where are they 
emerging, and who is telling them?
Continent of Broken Dreams? Odile Chenal
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Continent of Broken Dreams?
The making of European narratives? A rather trivial topic when Europe is in 
such deep crisis! When we are in the heart of a storm, when the institutional 
bedrock of the community of Europeans is shaking – is it really the right moment 
for tales, emblematic stories, and narrations? 
Yes it is! Beyond the refreshing lightness of the term, there is an urgent and 
increasing need for new, inspiring narratives from across Europe.
This essay looks back on the attempt by the European Cultural Foundation 
(ECF) to grasp something of the European narratives in the making, and retraces 
the course of our tentative journey.
Why Narratives?
The word narratives, borrowed from art criticism and the social 
sciences, made its appearance in political discourses a few years ago. 
Here and there, on various European platforms, politicians started 
claiming that ‘Europe needs new narratives’. We all know why: there is 
a disconnection between Europe and its people, between the European 
Union and its citizens. The 2005 referendum was the wake-up call to a 
creeping malaise: those living in the EU are often critical of the distant 
power of Brussels and its rather non-transparent decision-making 
processes; they don’t feel they are citizens of Europe. And those who 
strive to become part of Europe’s political project – the EU – feel 
excluded. 
The initial vision of Europe as a project for peace and welfare has 
blurred; even the magic of 1989 does not resonate any more. People 
living in this continent experience Europe every day, yet they don’t feel 
that they belong to it. Young people often do not see the need for Europe 
between the local and the global. At the same time, there is a strong 
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movement towards the national, a withdrawal within national borders 
in European countries. 
A few years on, the malaise has transformed into a profound crisis 
that is much more than a financial one. Is it the confusion of a 
fragmented society which seems to be unable to picture itself in the 
future, beyond fears and borders? Is Europe a continent of broken 
dreams? Aren’t there any new narratives inspiring the young generations 
of Europeans, within and beyond the EU, at the beginning of the 21st 
century? And if there are any, where are they emerging, and who is 
telling them?
With these – bold! – questions raised, ECF decided in 2009 to engage 
in a reflection on these narratives that we are all in such urgent need of. 
Needless to say, ECF had neither the pretention nor the naivety to seek 
out any ready-made European narratives, let alone the big collective 
story. What we reflected on was the making of new visions and stories 
and how they break through in the European public sphere. What we 
hoped for was some insight into what these narratives could tell us, if 
they could tell us anything. 
We should indeed confess that we have been seduced by the concept 
of ‘narrative’. In spite of its multilayered meanings and its (too) 
convenient vagueness, we gladly adopted it rather than such terms as 
‘vision’, ‘identity’, ‘culture’. Because a narrative is a storyline in the 
making, at the intersection of the personal and the public; an open-
ended exercise of cultural and political imagination.1
Through research and essays (as this publication shows), but also 
through cultural projects, seminars, and debates, we have explored over 
the past four years the semantic jungle of narratives. It really was an 
exploration. We did not know precisely what we were looking for, or 
which trails to follow first. We had no idea where this journey would 
1 We even created our own definition: Narratives are collective stories and representations, 
which are made of people’s memories of the past, experience of the present, and above all 
imagination of the future. Narratives underpin and bind communities; they make them move.
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lead us. Four years later, we pause to decide how to go further. We take 
stock of our findings, and try to decipher the map we have been drawing 
on the way. 
Trails
The first choice we had to make was whether we would go in the 
direction of political discourses and narratives or search through the 
limitless territories of non-institutional narratives. Institutional 
narratives – the visions and stories given prominence by European 
institutions – are badly needed. Like many others, we hope that one day 
there will be strong independent voices, in Brussels or elsewhere in 
Europe, able to propose bold objectives and new dreams that transcend 
national and electoral interests. But, as necessary as they are, these 
institutional narratives will not work if they do not chime with people’s 
experience and imagination. For this reason, without ruling out 
incursions into the territory of political discourse, we decided to focus 
primarily on ‘bottom-up’ narratives: cultural expression, ongoing 
storylines, and citizens’ voices that are less – or not yet – heard. 
Yet one question concerning institutional narratives continued to 
puzzle us: how might European political narratives avoid reusing (but 
with a European gloss) those very instruments of 19th-century nation-
state building – the exclusive identity discourse, monolingualism, 
culture of borders, centralism, etc.? What narratives could be woven for 
a European space with flexible borders, a multiplicity of languages, and 
yet strong national frames? How can European institutions develop 
narratives that are shared by people of all backgrounds and generations 
in Europe, without denying differences, dissonances, and even 
conflicting memories and perspectives?2
Wishing to investigate primarily non-institutional narratives, we 
2 Several contributors in this book add to this reflection, especially Wolfram Kaiser and Monica 
Sassatelli, but also Milla Mineva and Kerstin Poehls.
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were naturally confronted with an impossible choice. Where to start? 
Which direction to choose, when there are a multitude of directions. 
Which of Ariadne’s threads would we follow? It would be futile to report 
on every hesitation, turning, confusion, impasse, dilemma, and choice 
(made rationally or intuitively). So here are just a few of the chosen 
trails.
One can try to identify narratives through the changing perception 
of space, the new geographies. We live in a multilayered system of visible 
and invisible borders, and the shifting is constant. The EU itself is 
increasingly becoming a border-management authority: opening 
borders here and at the same time restricting passages there, in order to 
regulate various flows of people and goods within and towards Europe. 
New experiences and visions of Europe are therefore emerging among 
those people who, in very different ways and circumstances, are crossing 
these physical, social, and cultural borders. They draw their own maps, 
which happen not to coincide with our segmented national and political 
geographies. Who are they? Not only nomadic artists, not only the 
thousands of privileged Erasmus students, and not only the hundreds of 
thousands of well-travelled decision-makers and networkers flying daily 
across Europe – but also ‘migrants’; those who, coming from elsewhere, 
can be called ‘new Europeans’.
 Some attention is paid, especially artistically, to the perspectives of 
those who have tried to enter European territories, often risking their 
lives to do so. Here is Europe as an impregnable fortress, an inaccessible 
dream. But what is the vision of those migrants who are inside? They 
are endlessly questioned about their double cultural belonging, but 
what is their image of Europe? And, to start with, is there any Europe in 
their stories? Writers and other artists among them show us that Europe 
is often perceived as a fragmented, complex space of routes, channels, 
margins, checkpoints, and points of contact. Their experiences from 
inside contribute to the drawing of new maps, progressively blurring our 
static representations of Europe. And are fully constitutive of our new 
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narratives.3 
Another broad trail is offered by the perceptions of Europe from 
outside. For centuries, Europe has perceived itself as the very centre, the 
space around which the rest of the world was displayed. And for all 
kinds of reasons linked to our distant and close past, we often, even in 
this global age, keep on looking at Europe from the inside. New 
narratives will not only be generated by inward contemplation, however. 
The views from other regions of the world, and the expectations they 
hold, will be intrinsic dimensions of future European narratives. The 
stories and discourses of the so-called new global powers should be 
carefully listened to. Former European colonies, especially, can cast an 
eye of critical empathy on the old continent. The European narratives of 
the 21st century can only be those of a continent which envisions itself 
as one of the players on the global stage.4
Multi-loaded lieux de memoires, hidden and unfinished histories, 
conflicting memories: history is a vast field for investigating narratives, 
in a future perspective as well. Many organisations and research centres, 
writers, social scientists, and artists are questioning the European future 
in the light of its past. ECF has not yet ventured into this territory, but 
there is a key that we could be tempted to use more in future activities: 
the key of generations. “Change only comes through coalitions between 
generations,” the former Chancellor of West Germany, Helmut Schmidt, 
is said to have remarked. How will we be able to invent compelling 
stories for the future, in a Europe where the gap between old and young 
is growing everywhere – in urban spaces, market strategies, political 
practices, digital communication, etc? At ECF, we believe there is a 
dynamic potential in two-way exchange and confrontation between 
groups of people that have been through very different historical 
experiences – a potential for apprehending, and preparing better for 
change. In spite of the rapid demographic change (read: ageing) of our 
3 See contributions from Kerstin Poehls and Rainer Ohliger.
4 See contributions from Amitav Ghosh and Paul Scheffer.
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European society, which could lead to increasing tension between 
generations, the ‘intergenerational’ dynamic for forging new narratives 
remains largely unexplored and untapped. 
Social Experimentation
As previously said, top-down institutional narratives constitute a 
necessary part of the political landscape. But in the context of European 
fatigue and disaffection for established political vehicles, they will not 
be effective enough to lead Europe towards its future; and surely not if 
they do not come to grips with citizens’ initiatives. The stories of 
tomorrow indeed must also be looked for – and perhaps first looked for 
– among local, groundbreaking initiatives where young, and older, 
people develop new political languages and practices and experiment 
with new models of civic participation, joined by artists whose 
imaginative approach sharpens the challenge of such initiatives. It is 
about carving out new routes for our continent, re-inventing its 
democratic models, shaping its future: thinking outside the box, across 
sectors and disciplines, across fragmented social and physical spaces. 
Naturally, this is again a mer à boire. The only possibility is to identify 
some spots. And dive in. This is what ECF wants to do in the near future.5 
It means that we will also reflect on the narratives ‘the other way round’: 
instead of asking ourselves Are there new narratives, and if so, where?, we 
will identify – and connect – local projects that seek social 
transformation, and reflect on what it is they are telling us and how 
they inspire the making of larger narratives, beyond borders. 
Four years on, we have not changed the world – Europe is not going 
better, the opposite is true – but, in the first sketch of our new map of 
Europe, there are bright spots. Yes, we believe that there are new stories 
in the making for Europe – by many people, in many domains, and 
5 See Katherine Watson’s contribution.
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especially through artistic expression and social experimentation. But 
the voices are still too hushed; the stories do not yet echo in the public 
and political spheres. It is the pressing responsibility of European 
transnational players to further identify and amplify them. They will 
inspire people in Europe to imagine themselves as the new plots of their 
own narratives.
‘Indignez-vous!’ declares the 94-year-old Stephane Hessel, in a 
pamphlet that has become a bestseller throughout Europe. Yes! And we 
should add a second volume: ‘Imaginons-nous!’.





But what should be the new compelling 
narrative of the European project? 
Scholars and other intellectuals 
have given different answers to this 
question.
Connecting the Threads Bas Snelders
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Connecting the Threads
As one of the contributors to this volume rightly points out, the 
European Cultural Foundation (ECF) is not the only institution searching 
for and collecting new European narratives. On the contrary, this pursuit 
is part of a more widespread movement. A common refrain in recent 
years is that Europe needs a new story to tell. Among the earliest and 
arguably most fervent champions of this idea was Timothy Garton Ash. 
In a column published in The Guardian (March 2007), he stressed that, 
since the end of the cold war, the shared political narrative that 
sustained the post-war project of European integration for three 
generations has fallen apart: “Most Europeans now have little idea 
where we’re coming from; far less do we share a vision of where we 
want to go. We don’t know why we have an EU or what it’s good for. So 
we urgently need a new narrative.” But what should be the new 
compelling narrative of the European project?
Scholars and other intellectuals have given different answers to this 
question. For instance, Ulrich Beck in his 2004 Das kosmopolitische Europa 
(Cosmopolitan Europe) maintains that such a narrative should 
emphasise a political and cultural vision for a multi-ethnic and 
cosmopolitan Europe. Beck’s idea of a European narrative is further 
developed by, among others, Helle Porsdam, who argues that this 
narrative is intimately bound up with human rights – indeed, may even 
be characterised as a ‘human rights narrative’. In this, according to 
Porsdam, “the European narrative shows a certain similarity to the 
American Dream or narrative – a Dream that, in its political 
manifestation, may be described as the right to have rights. On the part 
of the European Union, human rights are emphasized as something 
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upon which all Europeans agree.”1 In a similar vein, Garton Ash proposes 
that the new story should be woven from six strands, each of which 
represents a shared European goal: freedom, peace, law, prosperity, 
diversity, and solidarity. None of these goals “is unique to Europe, but 
most Europeans would agree that it is characteristic of contemporary 
Europe to aspire to them.”
Like Garton Ash, Klaus Eder suggests that, rather than take a single 
story, Europe should perhaps combine a series of stories that distinguish 
it from the national Member States of the EU.2 Since there are many 
stories about Europe floating around, however, it remains problematic to 
decide which of these narratives actually ‘should’ or could be selected 
for such a combination. Eder argues that there is no definitive solution 
to this problem, but that Europe is confronted with the challenge of 
coordinating at least three hegemonic stories: “There is a story based on 
a successful process of unification, i.e. the story of the European 
integration process as a successful economic and political project, 
which founds a European citizenship narrative. This is the story of the 
making of a rich, yet socially responsible continent, the story of an 
economic yet social Europe. There is another story that emerges from 
the memory of a murderous past of Europe. The space of communication 
based on shared memory is a potential source of strong feelings. Stories 
telling a shared past constitute boundaries with high emotional value. 
There is finally a story that relates to Europe as an experiment in hybrid 
collective identities, not as a ‘melting pot’, but as a ‘diversity pot’, which 
is a story in the making.”
Seen from this perspective, European narrative is a dynamic 
1 Porsdam, H. 2007, ‘On European Narratives of Human Rights and Their Possible Implications 
for Copyright’, in: F. Macmillan (ed.), New Directions in Copyright Law: Volume 6, Cheltenham, 
335-358; eadem 2009, From Civil to Human Rights: Dialogues on Law and Humanities in the 
United States and Europe, Cheltenham/Northampton, MA. 
2 Eder, K. 2009, ‘A Theory of Collective Identity: Making Sense of the Debate on a “European 
Identity”’, European Journal of Social Theory 12/4, 427-447.
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combination of different stories. In Eder’s view, the stories by which 
Europe is constructed do not simply co-exist; rather, they influence one 
another: “Europe produces stories about itself in the permanent 
confrontation with stories about the Other which again is producing 
effects in the Other who produces his own stories by looking at the first 
as the Other.” It has been argued that Europe fails because there are 
simply too many stories. Eder suggests, however, that this plurality of 
stories may in fact turn out to be an advantage: “instead of imposing a 
hegemonic big story Europe can live with a diversity of stories that need 
only one property: to offer nodes as docking stations for other stories. 
Thus storytelling in Europe will be an open process, capable of taking up 
new stories without assimilating them. The only criterion that counts is: 
to be able to continue to tell a story.” 
The idea that the diversity of stories may well turn out to be an 
advantage for Europe has recently also been put forward by Janie 
Pélabay, Kalypso Nicolaïdis, and Justine Lacroix in their conclusion to 
European Stories: Intellectual Debates on Europe in National Contexts (2010). 
They argue that the quest for a unique and unanimous European 
narrative is actually a non-starter: “The pluralism that characterises 
Europe’s cultures and politics, Europe’s socio-economic systems, and 
Europe’s national bargains extends perhaps even more deeply to its 
intellectual traditions, thus giving rise to a ‘deep diversity’ of narratives 
about Europe and the EU.” In analysing the ways in which ‘public 
intellectuals’ have debated Europe since the early 1990s, they discovered 
not one story but a multiplicity of stories. Moreover, these stories not 
only displayed many divergences between different EU Member States, 
but also multiple lines of contestation within distinct national contexts. 
This leads them to suggest that “it is perhaps the combination of this 
diversity of stories into a grand and extravagant polyphony that is the 
ultimate European story.”
ECF has also been interested in the role of ‘public intellectuals’ and 
their visions and interpretations of Europe. With the SPUI25 academic-
cultural centre, ECF organised Narratives for Europe: Stories that Matter 
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(2011), a series of lectures, dialogues, and interviews in which ten 
authors and thinkers were invited to present their stories about Europe. 
In her presentation of their reflections here, Niña Weijers points out 
some of the most significant convergences between them. By combining 
the different stories told during the events, she can be said to offer the 
first rough outlines of a new narrative for Europe. To be sure, the present 
volume does not intend to present or identify any ready-made European 
narratives – a point Odile Chenal emphasised in the previous section. As 
the title of the book suggests, it is about the ‘making of narratives’, the 
ways in which narratives emerge, unfold, and impact in Europe today. 
And how they contribute to the remapping of Europe. 
The content of the book is largely based on some of the essays 
gathered in the ‘Reading Room’ of ECF’s online space Narratives for 
Europe, and it is organised along a few main themes that we identified. 
The contributors to the ‘Reading Room’ and to this book are authors 
that we have encountered over the past four years during our 
exploration of European narratives. By way of an introduction, the other 
essays collected in this volume will be briefly presented below, not 
necessarily in their order of appearance, but highlighting some of the 
connecting threads between them. 
It is now commonly agreed that the ‘foundational’ myth of Europe as 
a project for peace and shared welfare does not ‘work’ anymore. Besides, 
it has gradually given way to other institutional narratives. The 
dominant narrative of Europe at the institutional level today is one that 
tries to find its unity in diversity. In her contribution, Monica Sassatelli 
discusses the unity-in-diversity rhetoric, and how it is taken up beyond 
Brussels. She points out that the institutional narrative of Europe is not 
only used by the EU institutions themselves, but also by people in 
contact with these institutions, such as scholars and ‘public 
intellectuals’, as well as local recipients who translate the narrative into 
actual initiatives and policies – notably in the cultural sector. 
One of the cultural institutions in which the unity-in-diversity 
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rhetoric has found its way is the museum. This can be linked more 
broadly with recent developments in the museum sector to create 
European museums and reorient existing collections toward a more 
‘European’ narrative. The emerging musealisation of Europe and the 
Europeanisation of the museum sector serves as the starting point for 
Wolfram Kaiser’s essay, in which he addresses the development of 
cohesive master narratives of EU history in museums and exhibitions. 
He shows that there is a trend towards presenting any story as just as 
valid as any other story of the past, which manifests itself in the rapid 
growth of eye-witness industry in museums. Eye-witness accounts are 
often used to advance an enthusiastically positive and optimistic 
narrative of post-war European integration and the present-day EU and 
its future. Pointing out that this narrative strategy is highly ineffective, 
Kaiser suggests to induce, collect, and represent narratives of Europe by 
engaging citizens in ‘participative narrating’ – that is, motivating them 
to tell their own stories. 
Besides permanent exhibitions and collections, temporary 
exhibitions have also displayed a growing interest in European 
narratives. The development of narratives about Europe in exhibitions 
of modern and contemporary art from Central and Eastern Europe – 
which have been proliferating since 1989 – is discussed by Svetla 
Kazalarska. It proves that a set of stereotypical narratives have 
recurrently been brought into play, including so-called Europeanisation 
narratives that were triggered by the European integration process 
throughout the 1990s and by the two waves of EU enlargement in 2004 
and 2007. These narratives greatly resembled the clichéd ‘European talk’ 
of EU institutions in that they emphasised the role of art and culture in 
bridging the differences between the two parts of Europe. Whereas most 
of these narratives underscored the diversity of artistic processes in 
Europe across space and time, they simultaneously insisted on the idea 
of Europe having a cultural and political identity of its own, thereby 
simply reiterating the familiar unity-in-diversity rhetoric. 
By contrast, more recent art exhibitions seem to be in search of 
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inspiring alternatives to Europe’s dominant institutional narrative. 
Illustrative in this respect is the series of three exhibitions titled Scenarios 
about Europe (Museum of Contemporary Art, Leipzig), in which a group of 
curators worked together with different artists to put forward new 
propositions about Europe. In her exhibition review, Wietske Maas 
argues that the resulting scenarios directly confront us with difficult 
questions about Europe’s immense diversity. Some of the scenarios will 
eventually also be transferred to a number of cities – both inside and 
outside Europe – that are chosen because their relationship with 
Europe’s institutional level is, in a sense, ‘askance’. In this, China will be 
given a central role since, as stated by the project’s curator Barbara 
Steiner, “its relationship with Europe may be seen as particularly 
exposed in comparison with other relationships between European and 
non-European countries.” 
Indeed, the growing importance and influence of new economies 
such as China challenge current conceptions of Europe. The big question 
for the coming decades, raised here by Paul Scheffer, is how Europe will 
manage to deal with the economic and cultural innovation from East 
and South with which it finds itself increasingly confronted. The most 
important change is that the public perception of Europe in countries 
such as China, Brazil, and India will acquire ever greater significance for 
European societies. According to Scheffer, the growing importance of the 
‘outside gaze’ presents an invitation to write history in a new way and 
to replace the old ‘foundational’ myth of Europe with new narratives. He 
argues that a new narrative about Europe “should no longer take Berlin 
as its point of departure, but Beijing; must no longer begin in Paris but 
in São Paulo.”  
One example of such an ‘outside gaze’ is provided here by Amitav 
Ghosh. Like Scheffer, Ghosh acknowledges the importance of the newly 
emergent countries. But at the same time he argues that Europe is 
perhaps better equipped to point the way out of the economic and 
environmental crises that are currently facing the whole world: “If there 
is a silver lining in this grim scenario, it is that Europe happens to have 
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arrived at a point where it is singularly well-suited to take the lead.” 
Europe is able to show the way because it is, in the words of Ghosh, “the 
only part of the world that has succeeded in articulating and acting 
upon a vision of political organisation that goes beyond the nation-state. 
Its progress down that path has been slow and fitful, it is true, but I 
think deep down Europeans understand and appreciate the world-
historical significance of the project they have embarked upon….” 
In addition to the ‘outside gaze’, conceptions of Europe today are 
also greatly influenced by migration, both inside the EU and beyond. 
Until very recently, immigration and immigrants in Europe often served 
as ‘others’ in constructing nationally dominated historical narratives. 
“In these narratives, immigrants are not yet seen as an essential part of 
Europe or its nations; rather, they serve as entities against which 
excluding and exclusive collective narratives and identities are forged,” 
as Rainer Ohliger points out in his review of the film project Migrants 
Moving History: European Narratives of Diversity (2008). The film documents 
the narratives of various European ‘immigrant intellectuals’ in an 
attempt to identify possibilities for more inclusive European counter-
narratives. In fact, a gradual shift towards more inclusive European 
narratives can be seen in the countless exhibitions that have been 
dedicated to migration all over Europe and inside the EU over the past 
ten to fifteen years. 
The museal display of migration in current exhibitions in Europe is 
addressed here by Kerstin Poehls. Discussing how and why the 
phenomenon of migration is being narrated in temporary exhibitions, 
Poehls shows that the display of migration essentially serves as a 
negotiation of the borders of Europe. Questioning notions of European 
universalism, these exhibitions show how various public spheres and 
discourses interact and thus encourage museums to play a more central 
role in the self-reflection of European societies. Current migration 
exhibitions are anything but neutral or detached from political 
discourse. According to Poehls, they clearly reflect how a self-reflexive 
37
and budding version of cosmopolitanism that is closely linked to the 
concept of transnationalism – and which can be described as 
‘Europeanness’ – is slowly but surely being incorporated into exhibitions.
The narratives told by the migration exhibitions often seem to 
showcase an overtly positive picture, in which individual migrants are 
presented with their dreams and plans for the future.  In this sense, they 
are comparable with those ‘Europeanisation’ exhibitions discussed by 
Kazalarska, which seem to place great hopes and expectations on 
rebuilding the broken historical ties between the various European 
cultural centres in the aftermath of the EU enlargement. Yet in many of 
the new Member States optimism seems to have given way to 
disappointment and disagreement, as pointed out by Milla Mineva in 
her essay on the development and use of European narratives in 
Bulgaria. She shows that the institutional narrative of unity in diversity, 
while politically effective there at first, eventually turned into a more 
private narrative used by citizens to legitimise their own interests. 
According to Mineva, the problem of Bulgaria today, and of Europe at 
large, is the general lack of any new utopias. She therefore pleads for the 
invention of new collective narratives that will unite the people of 
Europe again, inspiring them to create a common future. 
This brings us back to the basic idea that Europe needs a new story 
to tell. While all the contributors underline the importance of new 
European narratives, Jason Dittmer makes the case for graphic narrative 
(for example, bande dessinée, comics, and graphic novels) as a medium 
especially suited to the production of new European narratives, both in 
official EU cultural policy and private enterprise. He outlines the role of 
space in graphic narrative, juxtaposing this with the way space is 
imagined within the EU, and suggests that Europe and graphic narrative 
share a common spatial imagination. Dittmer argues that openness to 
the outside world should be a crucial element in any new European 
narrative, and to that end he offers up narratives of everyday life as a 
genre worthy of promotion: “Rather than tales of heroism that remind 
readers of past imperialism, European everyday life (including its 
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connections to non-European lives) might serve as a powerful attractor 
around which a new European politics can emerge.”
More or less in keeping with Dittmer’s suggestion, the different 
chapters in the present book are framed by a series of short comics 
revolving around the everyday life experiences of Osvald, a common 
European, who may nevertheless be perceived as a ‘hero’. The five 
stories, told by a variety of artists from across Europe and beyond, are 
introduced by Thijs van Nimwegen. In recounting the genesis of Osvald, 
van Nimwegen describes Osvald’s stories as a sort of narrative relay: 
“nobody knows what’s waiting after the next turn, when a new author 
takes over the baton. We can only wait and see what will happen next to 
Osvald – and to Europe.” This reminds us of Klaus Eder’s point, referred 
to earlier, that European narratives should offer nodes as docking 
stations for other stories. “The end of the theoretical story is the 
observation that Europe is a space with contested stories and that it is 
through contestation that stories that bind can be told. In this space the 
linkages between stories will multiply and link many other stories that 
so far nobody considered to be part of Europe.”
Bas Snelders is a Research Fellow at the Laboratoire d’excellence Religions 
et sociétés dans le monde méditerranéen (LABEX RESMED), Université Paris-
Sorbonne. He is editor of the Reading Room of the ECF online space Narratives 
for Europe.
Our Hero Osvald
Thijs van Nimwegen 
Is Osvald a victim of violence, 
or a hypocritical journalist who 
died because his motives were 
unsound, getting famous by 
writing about other peoples’ 
misery?
Our Hero Osvald Thijs van Nimwegen
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Our Hero Osvald 
January 2011 was a cold, rainy month in the city of The Hague, the 
Netherlands. The ‘Comixiade core team’ – as we had begun to call it – 
consisting of Michal Slomka, Aneta Bendakova, Guido van Hengel, 
Vladimir Palibrk and me, met up for the first time in the office of 
Platform Spartak. To escape the dread of outdrawn wintry meetings, we 
took walks on the beach of Scheveningen and let ourselves be inspired 
while gazing into the swirling mists hanging over the grey expanse of 
the North Sea. And it was inspiration indeed that we needed: in the 
coming year and a half, we would have to coordinate the production of 
a great number of high-quality comics.
Our general theme was the untold narratives of Europe, not the great 
history, but the stories roaming the back alleys, subway stations, slums, 
and docklands of the continent. The problem we faced was how to give 
such a broad theme a clear binding factor. “We need a recurring 
character,” someone said. “Like a protagonist,” someone else added. “A 
recognisable face to be seen in each comic,” a third clarified. This was 
the moment Osvald was born, while dark clouds were moving in from 
the West and dusk was falling over the abandoned tourist shops of the 
pier of Scheveningen.
We returned to the office to flesh out the details of this persona. 
Osvald’s name was borrowed from the old world philosopher and 
historian Oswald Manuel Arnold Gottfried Spengler (1880-1936), best 
known for his book The Decline of the West (‘Der Untergang des 
Abendlandes’), in which he prophesises the decay and ultimate decline 
of Western civilisation – a fitting, gloomy, doomy reference, especially in 
a time of crisis, with Europe seemingly bound for exactly that social 
collapse. On a more practical note, the name Osvald was easily 
pronounceable in most European languages. We supplied Osvald with a 
background as a journalist, a nicotine-addiction, a great love for playing 
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the clarinet, and a striped shirt. Just the outlines, not too much detail – 
the details were left for the artists to fill in.
While we may not have been fully aware of it, the choice of an 
inquisitive, yet somewhat antisocial (anti-)hero as our binding 
protagonist is rooted in a long and respectable narrative tradition in 
Western fiction. It’s the tradition of the individual against the collective 
and ‘the system’, the dreamer against dull everyday life. Edgar Allen 
Poe’s Auguste Dupin may have been one of the first in a long family tree. 
Emerging halfway through the 19th century, after the decline of 
Enlightenment, in a romantic tradition that valued individualism above 
all, this detective inspired many epigones. Himself a dehumanised 
‘thinking machine’, his literary offspring developed ever more quirky 
personal traits. While Jules Verne’s protagonists are still men of science 
without any distracting personalities, Sherlock Holmes, perhaps the 
most famous of this kind, was a definite bohemian, fond of pipe smoking 
and the occasional hit of cocaine, and definitely not a well-adjusted 
member of society. In contrast, the system, in Holmes’ case represented 
by Scotland Yard, is bureaucratic, haughty and arrogant, yet wholly 
incompetent.
The 20th century saw the advent of modern comic strips and, of 
course, the transfer of this kind of protagonist to the new medium. 
Tintin is probably the most famous example. While clean-shaven and 
polite, he eschews authority whenever he thinks he’s right – which he 
always is. And if authority – the collective – appears, it may not be 
malignant, but most of the times it is dim-witted and clumsy – just 
think of the twin police detectives Thomson and Thompson.
In literature, and later in film, the hero-against-the-world turned 
into more of an anti-hero and lost his positive outlook. Franz Kafka’s 
Josef K. (Der Prozess), George Orwell’s Winston Smith (Nineteen Eighty 
Four), and Döblin’s Franz Biberkopf (Berlin Alexanderplatz) are characters 
that have to find their way through an unknown, frightening world, and 
find out its hidden, secret truth – hidden by a system that has turned 
from dumb yet relatively harmless into a frightening, repressive 
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machine. This searching in itself is what still makes them part of the 
tradition – the need to find out what is the nature of that unseen thing 
in the dark.
Osvald carries characteristics of all of these protagonists. He’s 
curious yet disillusioned, active yet lethargic, creative yet bound towards 
his own demise. He’s a journalist, but a journalist who has turned his 
back on big scoops and instead focuses on those aspects of life many of 
us would rather not see. He’s an enthusiastic musician, but he prefers a 
concert for two in an abandoned alleyway to a place in the limelight.
The best part of Osvald though, is the fact that we, the Comixiade 
core team, never designed him to be that way, on that dreary afternoon 
on the beach of Scheveningen. He was created by dozens of artists, and 
his appearance, character, and personal traits are shifting even as we 
speak. Osvald may therefore represent a whole new generation of the 
inquisitive anti-hero – a fluid character, showing different traits, 
depending on the reader.
The comics presented in this volume are all examples of these traits, 
and follow Osvald’s fragmented life. In the first one – Ovarian Lottery 
(Birth of Osvald) – we are introduced to the character’s fluidity, even 
before he is born. Most comic characters – like Tintin – seem to have no 
families, no life outside of their adventures, and they were never born. 
However, animator Siebe de Boer from Groningen, the Netherlands took 
it upon himself to depict Osvald’s birth. This experimental, wordless 
comic – almost like a painting – meditates on the randomness of birth. 
As Siebe explains: “This comic is based on a concept by American 
business investor and philanthropist Warren Buffet. He proposed to 
imagine rules – economic, social, environmental – for the world you’re 
going to live in. But there’s a catch; you don’t know if you’re going to be 
born rich or poor, male or female, in the North or in the South. There are 
7 billion balls in the drum, and you can only pick one of them. It’s the 
most important thing to ever happen to you.”
In the second comic, we see Osvald having acquired the 
characteristics we gave him. In Muted (Rise of Osvald) he’s living the life 
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of a European wanderer, exploring the streets of Istanbul – a city 
illustrator Agata Wawryniuk from Wroclaw, Poland had never visited, 
but compiled from photos, videos, and her own imagination. 
Amsterdam-based writer, translator, and editor Canan Marasligil wrote 
the scenario. She decided to give Osvald a complicated start and have 
him explore the current climate in Turkey. In her own words: “Journalists, 
artists, writers, intellectuals may be prosecuted, silenced, even put in 
jail for their work and their ideas. Political context aside, I wanted to 
explore Osvald’s capacity to overcome this, imagining him as a sort of 
European hero. He realises all music has been muted, but he tries to 
play anyway, and in the end the sound finally comes out of his clarinet. 
In the background, we can see the police arriving, but Osvald plays... 
and plays... For me, he is a symbol of hope that I still want to believe in.” 
In a way, this comic also represents Osvald’s wild years – he’s at his most 
Tintin-like here, with a dash of inquisitive Holmes thrown in.
Osvald’s Secret, the third comic, is a small intermezzo showing Osvald 
creating a patchwork blanket – a fitting symbol of European collective 
identity as a patchwork of individual narratives. Belgrade-based artist 
Maja Veselinovic works mainly as a children’s book illustrator, and her 
style here is colourful, open, playful, and direct. As for Osvald’s 
development, here we see him in mid-life, grown to maturity and self-
confident. He has found his place, and clearly lost some – not all – of his 
wild hairs.
The fourth comic was drawn by Tomas Kucerovsky from Brno, Czech 
Republic. Kucerovsky has created concept art for a number of computer 
games, and this has made his style ‘graphic’ in more than one meaning 
of the word. I found him to be the perfect artist to visualise my own 
scenario for Spengler Complex (Europe), in which we see an aged Osvald, 
gone cynical and negative. In a heavily urbanised continent in the grip 
of economic crisis, he indulges in apocalyptic fantasies, made more real 
by long walks through depressing neighbourhoods. The border between 
reality and fantasy is gradually blurred, as urban decay becomes urban 
crisis and turns into urban destruction. A link is made with a general 
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European preoccupation with end days and the downfall of empires, a 
mind-set described by his (partial) namesake, Oswald Spengler, 
mentioned earlier. This is Osvald the anti-hero: caught in an unclear 
netherworld with no way out like Winston Smith, roaming the urban 
sprawl under the doom of his own thoughts like Franz Biberkopf.
This dark tone is sustained in the fifth and final comic, Good Story 
(Death of Osvald). This play of storylines was created by brothers Vladimir 
(scenario) and Vuk Palibrk (comic art) from Pancevo, Serbia. We see 
Osvald, now an old man, experiencing an internal conflict. The ending is 
deliberately open and unclear: is Osvald a victim of violence, or a 
hypocritical journalist who died because his motives were unsound, 
getting famous by writing about other people’s misery? As Vladimir 
explains: “The twist lies in the fact that he wanted to write a good story, 
but instead became part of a story himself: ‘Journalist killed in Belgrade 
street riots’.” Osvald’s death seems a simple necessity, like Joseph K.’s 
casual demise.
However, Osvald is still a comic character, meaning he cannot really 
die and lives on if the artists and the public want him to. The comics 
presented here are just a small part of the complete epic of Osvald, 
comprised in the ‘Comixiade’ book. Many other aspects of the character 
are revealed there and we even see alternative outcomes of the Osvald 
storyline, as his stories are an example of a collective, interactive tale, a 
hyper textual comic making for a sort of narrative relay race; nobody 
knows what’s waiting after the next turn, when a new author takes over 
the baton. We can only wait and see what will happen next to Osvald – 
and to Europe.
Thijs van Nimwegen studied Comparative Literature and Journalism in 
Utrecht, Antwerp, Groningen, and Leipzig. He is a producer and project manager 
for Spartak, Interdisciplinary Platform for Eastern Europe, where he co-founded 
and organised Comixiade, part of ECF’s Narratives initiative. He also works 
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Has Europe Lost 
the Plot? 
Monica Sassatelli
Are European narratives only on 
the intellectualised, elite side of the 
spectrum, speaking only to the brain 
and not to the heart?
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56
Has Europe Lost the Plot? 
What is Europe’s narrative? Even opposing views often reach similar 
conclusions: some say there is no European narrative, others that there 
are too many and therefore, by this very diversity, they have no shared 
meaning, solidarity, or identity. Since the start of the current euro-crisis 
the public debate has been dominated by those who argue that a 
fundamental lack of solidarity, well-hidden during times of economic 
growth, has now been exposed, bursting like one of those financial 
bubbles that brought us here (although, not only us Europeans). Europe 
fails because its many narratives are not part of one story. 
Still, despite the amount of energy that has been devoted to the 
study of European identity, the main questions remain open and their 
premises unchallenged. Is diversity something Europe has to ‘deal with’, 
in the sense of mitigating, alleviating, tolerating? Are the supposedly 
homogenising forces of globalisation necessarily at odds with 
‘preserving’ specific identities? Are European narratives only on the 
intellectualised, elite side of the spectrum, speaking only to the brain 
and not to the heart? Is this especially the case when narratives 
emanate out of the EU, a technocratic project pushed too far too fast, as 
the current economic and political crisis encourages many observers to 
argue? Perhaps some answers and alternatives lie in looking at the 
concrete and evolving institutional narratives of Europe, and how those 
are taken up beyond Brussels.
Europe Seen from Brussels 
The emphasis on Europe finding its ‘story’ currently animating 
public debate can be linked more broadly to shifts in how identities are 
conceptualised. In the social sciences, there has been a well-documented 
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‘narrative turn’ towards a focus on meanings and their dependency on 
contexts, rather than on structural (‘factual’) aspects in social life. 
Identity, in particular, can be seen as a narrative. That is, having realised 
that the concept of identity has essentialist overtones, and that when 
speaking of identities it is easy to forget that they are constructs based 
on self-understandings that draw from cultural repertoires and 
available narratives, the focus has shifted to the latter, to the narratives.
Contemporary Europe is a good example of both the possibilities and 
the dangers of narratives of identity. By thinking of Europe as embodied 
in specific narratives – public, academic, institutional – we can consider 
the several ‘Europes’ that are at stake. As well as several narratives of 
Europe, there are several performances of these narratives. If a key 
dimension of Europe’s story is its institutional narratives, another one 
concerns how these will be performed beyond Brussels and other 
institutional headquarters.
The apparent contradiction of the opposing critiques of lack or 
excess of European narratives may find a solution here: Europe has 
several narratives, but what about its story, its making sense of them in 
a meaningful plot? Does Europe have dedicated storytellers and public 
spheres for that story? The current economic crisis can be placed in the 
storyline of necessary further European integration, or, as the media 
have tended to stress, of the ‘dangers of renouncing national 
sovereignty’. As many observe, European institutions – organisations 
originally qualified by other specifications, from ‘Coal and Steel’ to the 
more broadly ‘Economic’, until they successfully appropriated the term 
‘European’ – at the very least had a plot. This was a story of centuries of 
European wars put to a definitive end by increased collaboration and 
co-dependency; both the narrative and the economic strategy of the 
evolving EC institutions have been driven by this plot. It has been so 
successful in this that new generations of Europeans are less sensitive 
to it. European ‘public intellectuals’ keep referring to it, whilst 
acknowledging that it may no longer be what can hold Europe together. 
Umberto Eco declared that the ‘shallow’ European identity that was 
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sufficient for the founding fathers, thanks to that shared objective, may 
not be so any more: “Their Europe reacted to war and they shared 
resources to build peace. Now we must work towards building a more 
profound identity.”1
Today, Europe is in search of a new story to tell; first and foremost to 
itself. Needless to say, we can look in several directions for European 
narratives. Whilst certainly not limited to the process of European 
integration, contemporary Europe cannot ignore it: this institutional 
context is also that of more comprehensive or cultural ideas of Europe. 
It is not surprising that the interminable media debates on the current 
euro-crisis often end with vague references to a broader, more cultural, 
European identity, generally then bemoaning its inexistence. Looking at 
the EU and Council of Europe in particular, the image of a fragmented 
narrative becomes less tenable, as there is general agreement amongst 
analysts as to what the dominant narrative of Europe at the institutional 
level is.
The main institutional narrative about Europe’s culture and identity 
today is that of ‘unity in diversity’. Because of the need to incorporate 
the diversity of nations, especially at the level of culture and belongings, 
and because the painstaking process of imagining the Community and 
then Union has always been under everyone’s eyes, they have elaborated 
a complex rhetoric, which is synthesised in the well-known formula 
‘unity in diversity’. This is seen as a solution to the need for 
accommodating multiple allegiances and the plurality of national or 
local cultures (that is, of the much more powerful and established 
institutions). 
It is possible to follow step by step how the Council of Europe and 
the EU in particular have reached that narrative, and we find it embodied 
in key texts. Its earliest incarnation is probably in the Council of Europe’s 
1 ‘Umberto Eco: “It’s culture, not war, that cements European identity”’, The Guardian, 26 
January 2012 (Interview by Gianni Liotta). This article is part of a wider project on Europe (see 
www.guardian.co.uk/world/series/europa).
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1949 statute (“Diversity lies at the heart of Europe’s cultural richness, 
which is our common heritage and the basis of our unity”), but it is only 
in the 1990s that it started to be operationalised at EC/EU level. The 1992 
EU treaty article on culture states that the Community should promote 
“the flowering of the cultures of the Member States, while respecting 
their national and regional diversity and at the same time bringing the 
common cultural heritage to the fore” (TEU, art. 151). Making sense of 
Europe’s diversity – creating a narrative structure that integrates 
diversity without subsuming it, and progressively reframing it not as an 
obstacle or a lesser evil but as a resource and a strength – has been the 
European institutional strategy. 
This has been much criticised as contrived and the result of 
compromise rather than vision. It is a solution that many dismiss as 
empty rhetoric, as a cosmetic treatment to hide either irrelevance or a 
hidden hegemonic agenda. Indeed, the identity-building technologies 
used by nation-states are still in the hands of nation-states (education, 
media, but also welfare and military service). So self-proclaimed 
European institutions have to be very cautious when they try to plot 
their narratives of European culture. Too much emphasis on unity or too 
much detail on the actual content of the ‘common cultural heritage’ 
and they will provoke criticism from right and left, too much emphasis 
on diversity and they will simply provide arguments for those who say 
that actually there is no story to tell at all.
Telling Stories
Still, ‘unity in diversity’ is translated into actual initiatives and 
policies too, notably in the cultural sector. Although these are many and 
diverse, they have a similar style: they mainly stimulate local direct 
action, bestowing the title of ‘European’ to local agents, who then act as 
European, thereby providing content for that empty idea of ‘unity in 
diversity’. As a narrative ‘unity in diversity’ thus ‘decentralises’ the 
selection of the narrative elements, whilst promoting a common frame. 
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The danger of such an ‘empty’ narrative is that it risks being either 
ignored, or appropriated in too many different ways. Some believe it is 
therefore only viable when combined with stronger narrative structures, 
such as the post-WWII peace projects. Here, however, we start to see the 
limitations of concentrating on narratives only, with the risk of losing 
sight of who is telling the story.
The institutional narrative of Europe may be quite formulaic by now. 
However that narrative will be performed not only by the institutions 
themselves but also by people in contact with those institutions, 
particularly so because of the decentralised policy style mentioned 
above. Scholars and ‘public intellectuals’ participate, but so too do local 
recipients of the policies that translate the narrative into practice. Let’s 
look for instance at the European Capital of Culture (ECOC).2
Established in 1985, the ECOC is one of the longest running, most 
representative EU cultural initiatives. Whilst the EU is the initiator, the 
implementation is basically local (as with most EU cultural policies). 
Cities are asked to show a European dimension, but what exactly 
constitutes such a dimension is left to their own judgement. As a result, 
programmes have been very different, and it is this that highlights “the 
richness and diversity of European cultures and the features they share,” 
which is the ECOC official mission itself. This programme 
reconceptualises and repositions cities in a European space and history. 
ECOCs are not about the celebration of an essentialist European culture 
– that would be a faux pas the EU has learnt to avoid – rather, ‘European’ 
qualifies the cities themselves, becoming part of their self-
representation, of their story. 
The title has progressively become a transformative one: it is the 
candidate cities’ aspiration to become European capitals of culture that 
is assessed. Because the EU demands but does not define the European 
dimension for these candidates, it is precisely their ability to fill their 
2 For an extended account of research on the topic, see Sassatelli, M. 2009, Becoming 
Europeans: Cultural Identity and Cultural Policies, Basingstoke.
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candidature with meaningful stories, which wins the title. These cities 
thus become European. And if we look inside this European dimension as 
interpreted ‘locally’ we see that ‘unity in diversity’ is adopted but 
redefined. In the ECOCs and their programmes the interpretation of 
‘diversity’ becomes broader, and deeper. On the ground this narrative 
structure is indeed appropriated, but it is not necessarily interpreted 
according to default institutional meanings. Its ambiguity is used to 
actually far exceed the EU’s intentions – which are mostly about 
combining national and regional diversity within Europe – and moves 
towards something more like a cosmopolitan allegiance. For instance, 
most cities holding the ECOC title have a significant number of projects 
dealing with non-European cultures in their programmes. The notion of 
culture itself has expanded progressively, from high art in the first years 
to a much more encompassing one: this in a programme that began 
with Athens and Florence celebrating their contribution to the great 
European heritage.
These are practical forms of cultural Europeanisation that often 
escape analysis because of their ‘banality’. However, there is a key 
difference between banal Europeanism and banal nationalism, for 
which the expression was first coined. If banal nationalism is based on 
forgetting difference and complexity, so that its stereotypical identity 
stresses homogeneity, banal Europeanism’s public discourse has a 
different frame or plot that stresses ‘unity in diversity’. Europe and the 
nation are imagined, naturalised, and made banal differently: the nation 
stresses (or imposes) homogeneity, commonality, and single, exclusive 
identification, whereas Europe opts for an opposite solution that claims 
to be based on plurality, diversity, and multiple allegiances. Whether or 
not this is seen as creating a society or identity depends on how 




Europe’s story is about diversity and as such, contains a plurality of 
narratives. European institutional, public narratives are indeed 
recurrent and common, top-down if you like, but they allow and even 
need to be performed differently by different actors, in different 
contexts. What is relevant is both the fact that the institutional narrative 
frame is maintained, and that what makes it possible – as EU institutions 
have progressively discovered – is that it is a capacious one which the 
diversity of voices and public spheres can appropriate and fill with 
narrative elements. The shift to diversity as a resource, whether 
introduced as mere rhetorical gimmick or not, is fundamental.
The national story was about imagining a homogeneous, fraternal 
community based on similarity; as a categorical form of identification it 
could, generally, tolerate only modest amounts of diversity, because 
both the ideological and practical requirements of national democracies 
relied on similarity and centralisation. Europe, instead, sees itself as 
‘unity in diversity’, and this is another way of imagining a community. It 
is not a matter of being rhetorically ‘inclusive’: stories are, by definition, 
exclusive, they weave in certain narrative elements and exclude others. 
No story is the story of everyone, which is precisely why there are many. 
Notions of ‘inclusiveness’, often invoked by intellectuals and politicians 
about Europe, can be misleading; but so too notions of exclusion. 
European identity is a poor categorical identity, it struggles with defining 
both internal similarities and external differences, whilst the inverted 
combinations (internal differences, and external similarities) seem 
almost more appealing and, indeed, more European. 
As long as European narratives continue following other plots (like 
the national one) or thinking that existing narrative structures are the 
only possible ones, the European story may not work. Instead, the 
European story may be able to sacrifice much less diversity to the 
coherence or homogeneity of the whole story than that required by 
other, apparently similar, accounts of large-scale collective identities. 
63
Out of necessity rather than virtue, Europe has to find resources for 
telling a new type of story about identity, diversity, and solidarity. 
Monica Sassatelli is Lecturer in the Department of Sociology, Goldsmiths, 
University of London. Her book Becoming Europeans. Cultural Identity 
and Cultural Policies was published in 2009 by Palgrave and won the Philip 
Abrams Memorial Prize of the British Sociological Association. In this book 
the author addresses European identity as an object of both theoretical and 
empirical investigation, focusing on academic and institutional narratives of 
European cultural identity, with case studies on the European Capital of Culture 
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How Diversity Defeated Unity 
‘Who is the most popular politician in Bulgaria?’ is the question by 
which the temperature of public confidence is regularly taken here. 
Popularity charts occupy newspaper front pages and even lead to 
changes in public relations strategies. One such drop in ratings got the 
ex-premier of Bulgaria, and today’s Chairman of the Party of European 
Socialists (PES), on a motorbike and transformed him into a rocker. In 
the last three years the chart has been headed invariably by one 
European Commissioner, Kristalina Georgieva. Has Europe’s Eastern 
periphery actually discovered the secret of European identity? Is the 
periphery able to tell the new inspiring narrative of Europe?
A similar expectation accompanied 1989, when the fall of the Berlin 
Wall inspired Western observers to hope that Western Europeans, who 
had more or less got used to democracy, would reveal new enthusiasm 
for political participation. Nothing of the kind happened, however. While 
diagnoses shifted from optimism to accusation, the West expected 
‘voice’ and the East discovered ‘exit’ (to use Albert Hirschman’s terms). 
Not fortuitously, Francis Fukuyama’s idea of the end of history, brought 
about by the final victory of liberal democracy, was born then. Today, 
more than twenty years later, liberal democracy is in crisis, although we 
prefer to discuss economic policies rather than the withdrawal of 
citizens from the institutions of representative democracy. 
According to Jürgen Habermas, the revolutions of 1989 were marked 
by the absence of new ideas and new projects for the future. Viewed 
from Bulgaria, this authoritative diagnosis is only partially true. Indeed, 
no new political ideas existed: the return to Europe proved sufficient to 
motivate the huge transformations in Eastern Europe. That, however, 
was a project about the future, and the model of ‘the normal European 
countries’ was a motivating vision for the citizens of Eastern Europe, 
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though one without utopian horizons. There was no need for utopia, as 
there was geography. Yet, from the perspective of the contemporary 
crisis, something further seems to have been more important, namely 
the last political (i.e., collective) project for a common future. 
Eastern Europe actively contrived its own ‘return’ to Europe, giving 
an account of itself as essentially European in order to obtain the right 
of membership. Such was the role of the ‘Central Europe’ metaphor and 
the idea of ‘abducted Europe’ through which the Balkans turned into 
‘Southeastern Europe’. During the 1990s a narrative about the collective 
fate of Eastern Europe developed as did a desire for identification with 
the European community. In the last years of the twentieth century, the 
European narratives – multiple and uncertain (as they are still today) – 
were politically effective, and they were used by a large number of 
Eastern Europeans to change their own lives.
In this essay, I would like to adopt a pragmatic attitude to the identity 
narratives. The meanings that we construct succeed in becoming 
prevalent not only because they undergo a certain process of 
institutionalisation, but also because they are useful in providing 
answers to practical questions (as Eva Illouz reminds us). In reality, 
European narratives, re-read, poached, and shifted by people who used 
them, were successful in legitimising certain life strategies. I shall 
attempt to show how Europe was invented here, how Europe was being 
narrated during the accession process, and what cultural resources 
were used to legitimise the collective change. 
The EU quickly became synonymous with Europe, which has always 
been perceived in Bulgaria as a normative horizon. In fact, the dominant 
narrative about Europe was the familiar account of civilisation, of the 
‘advanced’ Europeans who would import ‘modern norms, values, and 
rules’. In this play, local and European actors participated 
simultaneously. On the one hand, the idea of accession as a mastering 
of norms imposed from the top legitimised even the pursuit of 
unpopular policies and justified the weaknesses of the local political 
elites. On the other hand, it allowed European actors to rediscover 
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meaning in the EU, whose underlying narrative had already lost some of 
its glitter. As it is, the export of European values helped both Western 
and Eastern Europe to claim a new legitimacy.
The use of old cultural resources and an essentialist concept of 
‘original European values’, have an extremely curious side effect. 
European actors referred to the recent past and insisted on its being 
read again. They were looking for the common European identity at the 
point where the founding narrative had originated – during World War 
II on the one hand and the Cold War era on the other. Eastern Europe 
had to cope with its own traumatic past and follow a ‘European’ model 
so that it could be recognised. 
Local actors, too, looked back in order to search for the historical 
legitimacy of their own European identity, but finding it only in the 
remote past. National histories were retold so that they could present 
the EU as the necessary destiny of Eastern European nations. In this 
process the national framework was not replaced by a European one (or 
not in Bulgaria, at least); rather the national history cannibalised the 
European one. Here is one example: in Bulgaria, a number of research 
papers were published with the objective of proving that Bulgarians 
were ‘the first Europeans’ (here we may refer to one of the books, 
Bulgarians: The First Europeans, by historian Bozhidar Dimitrov, Director of 
the National Historic Museum). The Bulgarian European Commissioner’s 
rating is a reflection of this particular perspective: she is Bulgarian, 
recognised as European. 
So, what was the unexpected effect of that account? The adhesion of 
the EU and Europe, the contemporary effort through accession to a 
supra-national unity, and the discovery of eternal European values 
actually prevent debate and the opportunity to formulate a European 
present. Due to the accession process, the political debate vanished 
legitimately – the promise was that we all would live better when the 
country became an EU member, while the path to change was clear and 
set by the roadmaps of European institutions. Rather than a debate on 
the European values of today, a reinterpretation of history took place, 
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leaving us with a policy of consensus and ritual (political) party fights. 
In fact, it was this particular reinterpretation of the European narrative 
– the only one to enhance the national account – that proved effective 
in the mobilisation of collective efforts. The elites resorted to the ‘us’ 
that was at hand instead of initiating the long and risky negotiation for 
the ‘us’ that we desire to be. 
What happened to ‘diversity’ in the EU’s motto? There were actors 
who recited the proper European narrative ‘unity in diversity’ so loudly 
that it started to seem unnecessary to debate publicly how much and 
what unity, on how much and what diversity. The narrative of diversity 
was effective for individual strategies, while the collective still remained 
within the framework of the national. Diversity accorded superbly with 
the market narrative, which focused on private interest and individual 
actors. Just as the concept of ‘diversity’ was reinterpreted as cultural 
diversity, the discourse on inequalities was substituted with a 
conversation about acknowledgment of horizontal cultural differences. 
Diversity was also relevant to another discourse: that of the active 
citizen. After the end of the communist era, Eastern Europe was 
narrated through collectivist metaphors and, not accidentally, there 
existed active policies for the building of a civil society in opposition to 
the state. In fact, that narrative overestimated the ideological 
consistency of communism and underestimated its real historical 
practice of blocking  of collective acts, which resulted in the alienation 
of people from the idea of collective activity. In that way, policies for the 
creation of activist citizens actually enhanced and legitimised a 
withdrawal from the contemporary public debate and enclosure within 
the private space. Protests actually increased in number after 2007, but 
they have always been presented as non-political. These civil protests 
refuse to formulate political visions and claims and refuse to speak 
about the common good, which meanwhile has been totally de-
legitimised. Civil protests have been powerful only when protecting 
private interests and blocking policies that threaten them. Citizenship 
has simply transformed itself into an individual strategy, whereas the 
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characteristics of a citizen have begun to be described as personal 
competencies and idiosyncrasies.
Social networks also play their role in the process of diminishing the 
civic sphere. Individual citizens easily identify followers. One of the 
most significant prerequisites of democracy – public debate of our 
common future – is replaced by communication with followers and a 
refusal to hold a debate. In that manner, it is easy to form civil groups 
that are active and confident about their rightness, who consider 
themselves a majority (as they never face their opponents) and who are 
able to successfully protect their own private interests.
 One of the most recent protests was that of the jailers in June 2012. 
Their slogan was: ‘Europe for us too’. In reality, the collective dream of a 
European future has become a private narrative used by various citizens 
to legitimise their own interests. European integration did not establish 
relations and solidarity at a supra-national level, rather it was 
transformed by local actors into a strategy for individual mobility and 
personal welfare. Citizens emancipated themselves from the territory, 
from neighbours, from public institutions. Citizens became mobile, 
turned into managers of themselves and, reminiscent of Luc Boltanski, 
rapidly mastered the new spirit of capitalism to become part of the 
global world. Bulgaria today reminds us of Margaret Thatcher’s famous 
statement that there is no such thing as a society, but only individuals 
and their families. The social has shrunk to the family. 
Quite recently, in a debate on the challenges facing liberal democracy, 
Ivan Krastev provocatively suggested that Bulgaria be regarded as the 
future of Europe. Transition, which has drawn on the legitimacy of 
European narratives, has effectively led to the complete disintegration 
of the social state and the application of unpopular economic reforms, 
without meeting any civil resistance. What was invented, claims Krastev, 
is a democracy in which politics does not offer a choice between 
alternatives, but is a system with no alternatives. It is the only possible 
political system which citizens dislike yet do not rebel against, because 
they have grown to believe that no other options exist. It is a democracy 
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that people accept, but which they cannot influence. 
This description greatly resembles the European situation at the 
moment. The March 2012 issue of Eurobarometer shows a decline in the 
approval of EU policies implemented in response to the financial crisis. 
Moreover, those policies, after all, gain approval primarily from better-
off social groups, although a downturn was observed from these groups 
as well. This means that employment policies are not perceived as 
opportunities to redistribute the burdens of the crisis or to equalise the 
positions of various social groups, but are seen as measures that benefit 
the elites. In fact, the discourse on redistribution seems to have been 
de-legitimised, as policies have been designed to provide incentives to 
businesses and to create conditions for economic growth, while trickle-
down economics are expected to do the rest. 
In the last twenty years, these passwords – economic growth, fiscal 
stability, and support of business – have been major political issues and 
the drivers of policies in Eastern Europe. The promise was that the 
market would guarantee fair distribution and welfare would ooze from 
top to bottom, provided there was economic growth. Actually, the 
dominance of economic discourse and the market imagination over the 
political seems to be the most precise description of what has happened 
in Eastern Europe and of what is currently happening. How much 
growth do we need? How much market are we in need of? The 
dominance of economic discourse – with its belief that the invisible 
hand of the market will solve the problems in a natural way – blocks the 
social imagination. How can people invent utopias if the social world is 
managed by natural forces? Should we be surprised that this pro-market 
discourse has given birth to individuals selfishly staring at their private 
interests? 
At the onset of the financial crisis the Chinese hieroglyph – for both 
crisis and opportunity – was a popular metaphor through which we tried 
to render meaning to the unexpected collapse. It becomes more and 
more difficult to think of what is happening as an opportunity. Neither 
states nor markets appear to be successful in identifying viable solutions 
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and gaining back the citizens’ trust. Today, it seems better to recall 
Antonio Gramsci, who, in the 1930s, defined crisis as a moment when 
the old is dying and the new cannot be born. On the one hand, the 
feeling that we cannot continue as before is shared throughout Europe. 
On the other hand, although the civil protest movements in recent years 
have clearly stated ‘their indignation’, they have not succeeded in 
formulating their desires, in making political claims, and, so far at least, 
have not yet conceived any new utopias.
 The future rather looks like an insurance policy, a risk we must 
prevent; it is fears, not dreams, that (pre)determine our actions. And 
that metaphor contains something more than a fear about the future. 
Signing an insurance agreement is an individual act – various risks lurk 
around us, against which we can employ only individual strategies. 
Being afraid of the future is not the issue; it is that we have desisted 
from thinking about the future collectively. Mobile individuals have lost 
the sense of being together; the absent account is the one about the 
meaning of living in a political community, of feeling connected to 
strangers – individuals different from ourselves – of being responsible 
for those who face other types of risk. Our societies have become so 
individualised and fragmented that they have lost the mystery of the 
modern social relation, the secret of solidarity with unfamiliar people. 
As Pierre Rosanvallon has written, it becomes increasingly harder to 
find meaning in society. It is for this reason we are in need not simply of 
a European narrative, but of a new political narrative. When the first 
European Coal and Steel Community was established, the founding 
fathers, as we call them now, shared one hope: that the common 
economic interests and practices would naturally result in a functioning 
democracy at the supra-national level. Today, we can observe that the 
very concept of political unification is in crisis; instead of coming to life 
in a natural way, political Europe has become a matter of risk and active 
commitment. We now need to invent collective political narratives that 
will unite globally mobile people to create a common future so that we 
can enjoy the world we shall live in tomorrow.
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No New DIN-norm, Please: 
Narrating Contemporary European History 
Multiple institutions are currently asking us Europeans to tell them 
our European stories. They more or less explicitly seek a degree of 
convergence and consensus in the way we remember, individually and 
collectively, our past and debate our future. Clearly, collecting European 
narratives is not an innocent cultural practice. Rather, it is a highly 
politicised normative practice to bolster – in this case – a particular 
‘European’ position in what the sociologist Claus Leggewie has recently 
called the European ‘battlefield of memory’. 
The search for European narratives appears to be motivated by two 
contemporary experiences. First, globalisation has created many 
opportunities, but also socio-economic losers who are harking back to 
an apparently better past. In an attempt to capitalise on the desire to 
feel emotionally secure through the collective memory of such a better 
past, populist right-wing political parties in particular propagate the 
resurrection of national master-narratives. More transnationally 
connected and socialised elites have rightly criticised these proposals’ 
underlying romantic notions of the nation which are defined in 
opposition to others. However, they have to offer other, more inclusive 
ways of remembering the past without sinking new historical narratives 
in a sea of globalisation and global history. ‘Europe’ appears to have the 
potential to serve as a sufficiently inclusive intermediate site for 
developing such new narratives. 
At the same time, the search for European narratives is often also 
motivated by the desire to strengthen the legitimacy of the European 
Union (EU). The early European integration process was still 
characterised by a strong permissive consensus. The citizens of the 
present-day EU largely agreed that integration was a good thing, but 
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they were not interested in its supranational politics. Since the debate 
about the Maastricht Treaty in the early 1990s, however, European 
integration has become much more contested. The quality of the EU’s 
policies no longer appears sufficient as a source of its popular legitimacy. 
Apparently, the EU as a polity is also in need of new narratives that 
could anchor it more than hitherto in a shared understanding of 
Europe’s history and culture. 
In the nineteenth century, historians played a key role in devising 
master-narratives as hegemonic ways of telling stories about the past, 
to form new nations and to foster state-building. In the words of the 
British historian Eric Hobsbawm, these historians were “to nationalism 
what poppy-growers in Pakistan are to heroin-addicts,” supplying “the 
essential raw material for the market.” More recently, however, historians 
have been inclined to deconstruct such national master-narratives. 
They advocate – with Konrad Jarausch – ‘narrative pluralism’ and 
‘narrative tolerance’ towards different ways of remembering the past 
and even, the same events. As these historians refuse to provide 
authoritative narratives of the past, they are naturally reluctant to 
devise blueprints for new European master-narratives.
Just as these historians, many cultural institutions like museums 
now only define the extreme limits of their own narrative tolerance. 
Within these limits, however, they often consider and present any story 
as just as valid as any other story of the past. This trend has fed the 
rapid growth of the eye-witness industry in museums which started 
with the Holocaust memorials and museums. 
Social psychologists and historians using oral history methods have 
shown that many decades after the events, people have a very blurred 
vision of the past. They integrate knowledge acquired and stories heard 
since these events into how they recollect them. It is crucially important 
to human beings to make their recollections appear coherent and 
compatible with their contemporary life circumstances and normative 
preferences. Thus, these testimonies tell us much about the eye-
witnesses, but very little about the past. 
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‘Narrative tolerance’ in cultural institutions creates two fundamental 
interlinked issues which most museum curators conveniently ignore. 
First, the vast majority of visitors still expect the museum to provide 
them with a reasonably cohesive and intelligible narrative of what 
happened when. Thus, they are bound to take the accounts of eye-
witnesses at face value. Second, as the curators induce, select, and 
present sections of particular eye-witness accounts using particular 
representational forms, the eye-witness is in fact another medium for 
propagating particular narratives while avoiding obviously authoritative 
statements.
One excellent example of such an attempted exercise of narrative 
authority drawing upon eye-witness accounts is the exhibition C’est 
notre histoire! which was on show in Brussels in 2007-2008 and in 
Wroclaw in 2009. To advance an enthusiastically positive and optimistic 
narrative of post-war European integration and the present-day EU and 
its future, the curators put 27 eye-witnesses at the core of their 
exhibition – one per Member State. At the entrance to the exhibition 
they actually claimed that they could have chosen any other EU citizen 
to tell the same story about lived European integration. 
The exhibition company Tempora has claimed that the combination 
of testimonies for C’est notre histoire! was not guided by any particular 
rationale. However, most of the 27 testimonies clearly appear to have 
been neatly selected and arranged so as to cover most of the EU’s major 
objectives and policies. In a similar vein, the European Parliament (EP) 
Visitors’ Centre opened in the autumn of 2011 also uses 27 eye-witnesses 
to explain the wonderful advantages of EU legislation and the beneficial 
role of the Parliament in bringing them about.
 This particular approach to utilising eye-witnesses for telling stories 
about the past involves the strategic identification of the overall 
narrative message; the asking of pre-formulated questions designed to 
provoke targeted replies; as well as, finally, a suitable technical and 
representational strategy to support the oral narrative. But this approach 
to narrating Europe raises two fundamental issues. The first concerns 
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the obvious strategic manipulation of the resulting narrative message 
about Europe’s contemporary history and the future of the EU. Can such 
a narrative strategy possibly be credible in the eyes of the beholder, or 
visitor? The answer to this question is emphatically, no. Visitors sense 
how hotly contested European integration was, and they definitely know 
how controversial many issues are in the present-day EU. If the narrative 
message glosses over such frictions and controversies, it can only 
contribute to the alienation of citizens from the EU. 
But such a glossy narrative message is not only ineffective, it is also 
not desirable; at least, if cultural institutions like museums really wish 
to serve, as they should try to do, as an important arena for debate 
about our understanding of a partly shared past and our preferences for 
a common future. Indeed, from this perspective it would be their 
primary purpose to bring out how our understanding of the past still 
differs, not just across national divides, and how our preferences for the 
future diverge; this precisely to assist a more strongly transnational 
deliberation about, and negotiation of, our narratives of the past and 
our views of the future. It is not the outcome of such a deliberation and 
negotiation that matters, but the process of engaging European citizens 
in it. 
How then to induce, collect, and represent narratives of Europe? The 
first option for cultural institutions is to engage citizens in what we 
might call participative narrating – that is, to motivate them to tell their 
own stories. Stories collected in this way will be stories of transnational 
encounters and experiences that will normally have taken place in a 
predominantly European geographical and social space. Such individual 
narratives may concern the first holiday outside of one’s own country or 
falling in love with another European national, for example. They may 
be predominantly positive or negative experiences including hurtful 
memories of occupation, oppression, and racism.
This form of participative narrating has potential to strengthen our 
collective memory of transnational and intercultural encounters in 
Europe. In this way it may well enhance what sociologists call our 
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civilisational identity as Europeans. Some of these transnational 
experiences may have been facilitated by legislation and policies of the 
present-day EU. But the non-strategic participative narrating is unlikely 
to bring out, let alone emphasise, the political context of European 
integration. It is, therefore, unlikely that this form of narrating European 
history as shared history can strengthen our identity as EU citizens. 
Narratives of European history designed to strengthen our collective 
political identity would have to go beyond the participative narrating of 
individual transnational experiences. To this end, memory entrepreneurs 
have proposed a variety of negative narratives of the European twentieth 
century. They always include the Holocaust as a key reference point. 
But, as Timothy Garton Ash has lucidly observed and sarcastically put it, 
not all Europeans may be keen to accept an equal share in the 
responsibility for the extermination of European Jews by Germans (and 
others) during the National Socialist rule over large parts of Europe, 
through the Europeanisation of this particular ‘German DIN norm’ for 
collective memory. Moreover, narratives of the Holocaust at the core of 
our collective memory can only remind us of basic norms of decent 
human behaviour and minimum standards of the rule of law, for 
example. Such repeated reminders are no doubt important for societies. 
However, these norms and standards are just as relevant to any other 
country or region in the world, especially others that have experienced 
genocides of one kind or another. Memory of the Holocaust definitely 
cannot be a source of legitimation for the EU and its present-day 
economic structure, political institutions or policies. 
Participative narrating of individual transnational experiences, then, 
needs to be complemented by a debate about what makes us European. 
Such open debate could produce narratives of our shared contemporary 
history which reflect our collective critical understanding of our past 
and its manifold dark sides; narratives, moreover, which would be 
characterised by a shared awareness of our internal diversity and 
fragmentation. Such a discursive construction of European narratives 
would set them apart from the nineteenth-century foundation myths 
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and master-narratives. However, such narratives cannot just cultivate 
the memory of negative reference points and over-emphasise internal 
difference. Collectively, we need to overcome our post-colonial 
inhibitions to define more clearly what actually makes us, as Europeans, 
different from other parts of the world. 
EU institutions have developed and propagated all kinds of smaller 
and larger myths. These narratives often serve particular institutional 
interests. Instead, we should debate narratives about larger questions 
about our political and societal organisation in contemporary historical 
perspective in which the EU would then feature as one key dimension. 
One of these narratives should evolve around the democratic 
constitution of Europe and its entities which has always been contested 
and remains fragile. Crucially, this is not, and must not be told as, a 
story from Aristotle to Barroso. It would have to address the deficiencies 
and weakness of European democracy past and present as much as its 
fundamental strengths, such as the recognition and protection of 
human rights and the transnational institutionalised negotiation of 
ideas and interests in the present-day EU. Nevertheless, such a narrative 
would remind us of core values that unite us; it would also enable us to 
propagate these norms and institutional solutions more confidently 
than the post-colonial value-neutral recognition of cultural difference 
might tolerate, which only induces contempt for an apparently soulless 
European society. 
A second narrative could evolve around our understanding of the 
relationship between individual rights and enterprise and social 
solidarity and cohesion. Within Europe, we have been largely united by 
the search for a third way between a liberal market system and a 
communist planned economy. This search is also linked to contested 
issues of European integration and EU politics. But despite different 
traditions and preferences within Europe, we nevertheless share similar 
ideas and have joint policies on social and welfare issues when 
compared to the United States or China, for example. Crucially, only this 
external comparison with other parts of the world can help us develop 
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reflexive narratives of our own – relative – unity. 
Cultural institutions like museums can tell such stories in different 
ways. They may well use the narrative of the so-called founding fathers, 
for example. But let us not proceed to the sacralisation of their political 
deeds. After all, Robert Schuman voted for Marshall Pétain in 1940 and 
Konrad Adenauer toyed with the idea of allowing Spain under Franco to 
accede to the present-day EU – behaviour and preferences that 
museums should discuss critically and not keep silent about, let alone 
condone in order to create a new European mythology utilising the 
same methods as nineteenth-century nationalists. Instead, such 
narratives should bring out how these politicians engaged in negotiating 
their different views on joint challenges such as the future of democracy 
in the Cold War or of social cohesion in the reconstruction of post-war 
Europe, and how in the end they arrived at common decisions and 
sometimes even, shared positions. They did so in the highly 
institutionalised political framework of the present-day EU which 
greatly facilitates the transnational experiences to be recorded in 
participative narrating processes. Moreover, despite legitimate criticism, 
it actually contributes a great deal to making our continent such a 
wonderful place to live. 
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Migrants Moving History:
European Narratives of Diversity 
What role do immigrants play in the construction of historical 
narratives within a uniting Europe? Can the cultural diversity spurred 
by immigration be included in new European narratives of diversity? 
What would such broadened historical pictures look like? Such general 
questions lay behind the project Migrants Moving History: European 
Narratives of Diversity; questions triggered not least by the fact that 
immigration and immigrants in Europe often serve – and have served in 
the past – as ‘others’ in constructing nationally dominated historical 
narratives. In these narratives immigrants are not yet seen as an 
essential part of Europe or its nations; rather, they serve as entities 
against which excluding and exclusive collective narratives and 
identities are forged.
The project Migrants Moving History: European Narratives of Diversity 
tried to challenge this rather linear and one-dimensional assumption 
and identify some possibilities for more inclusive European counter-
narratives. Immigrant voices, immigrant stories, and migration history 
became the starting point for this process. The project itself was 
launched in 2008 by Network Migration in Europe (Berlin) and enjoyed 
the support of the German Hauptstadtkulturfonds. The main ambition 
of the team was to document the narratives of various European 
‘immigrant intellectuals’, writers and film-makers, in interviews lasting 
around two hours each.1 Twelve individuals living in ten major European 
1 The following artists were interviewed: In Amsterdam, Fouad Laroui (writer); in Athens, 
Gazmend Kapllani and Petros Markaris (both writers); in Berlin, Wladimir Kaminer and Emine 
Sevgi Özdamar (both writers); in Istanbul, Annie Geelmuyden Pertan (art director and film-
maker); in London, Sarjit Bains (film-maker); in Luxembourg and Paris, Jean Portante (writer); in 
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cities were interviewed. These interviews formed the basis for a dialogue 
centred on the interrelation of history, migration, and diversity in 
Europe. The film footage was condensed into a 23-minute documentary, 
with an accompanying website making available a broader array of film 
material.2 Thus, the film material created a diverse narrative mosaic 
and established a virtual European dialogue, echoing crucial European 
voices on history and diversity. 
Mosaics of Belonging – Towards New Identities 
In the more recent research on identity formation in culturally 
diverse societies, it is argued that hybridity – the mixture of identities 
and a contextual or situative approach towards questions of belonging 
– is on the rise. Individuals as well as groups increasingly meander 
between various forms of belonging that overlap and intersect. Identity 
is no longer conceived in the singular; instead, plural and pluralistic 
conceptions are gaining momentum. In Europe this pluralisation of 
identities is due not least to the fact that immigration reshaped Western 
European societies, making them ethnically and culturally diverse and 
thus questioning the nation-state paradigm of a single clearly-bound 
national identity. The statements, reflections, and narratives of the 
interviewees provide ample evidence of this seminal shift, and of the 
redefinition of spatial and social belonging in contemporary Europe. 
Jean Portante, a Paris-based writer who was born in Italy and raised 
in Luxembourg, reflected on the transitional state of immigrants by 
pointing to the experiences of his parents and the interrelated family 
mythology: “My mother did not give up her plans of return,” he said. “For 
Madrid, Basel Ramses Labib (film-maker); in Oslo, Nefise Özkal Lorentzen (film-maker) and 
Michael Konupek (writer); in Warsaw, Steffen Möller (writer and comedian). Nine of these artists 
are immigrants themselves, and three were born into immigrant families.
2 The film and other extracts of the interviews are available on the project’s website: 
www.migrants-moving-history.org.
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her, it became something mythical, mythological. She settled in the 
definite interim, while my father had long settled in the interim 
definiteness.” This example of early post-war labour immigrants sheds 
light on the fact that the process of social inclusion – or its lack – 
exercised a lasting impact on the self-perceptions and individual 
positions of immigrants. Ambiguities and ambivalences of belonging 
emerged. Although the narrative of home and return was kept up, the 
practice of settling down produced a new state of being in-between 
definite and interim belonging. 
Portante’s Turkish-German colleague, the writer and actress Emine 
Özdamar, elaborated on this state of transition by drawing an analogy: 
“Sometimes you think that you have to choose one country and its 
language or the other. It’s as if you are stuck between your husband and 
a lover. You keep thinking you have to make a decision. […] They say, 
when you’re somewhere strange you lose your native language or that 
you’re in-between two places.” However, her personal experiences 
provide evidence that it did not turn into a question of either-or: “Well, 
you don’t have to be in-between two places, you can be in both. I realised 
about myself that I am in both places.” 
The experience of being and living in several worlds simultaneously 
featured in many statements. The German-born writer and comedian 
Steffen Möller, who commutes between Warsaw and Berlin, put it as 
follows: “I’m neither a Pole nor a German. I am a ‘betweener’. That’s 
what I call myself. The English would call it an ‘in-betweener’, I think. 
[…] My home these days is the Eurocity train between Berlin and 
Warsaw. I usually sit in the train restaurant with all the other 
betweeners. We are people who always make comparisons. We’re people 
who have a train in our heads that continuously goes from East to West.” 
Life in two countries and languages offers double or even multiple 
identities. The Greek-Albanian writer Gazmend Kapllani stated: “As I 
live in two languages, as I have lived in two countries, my life can be 
divided almost exactly in two; I think that I participate in both identities.” 
The author argued that this dual perspective and double state of 
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belonging creates a benefit for his intellectual work, as it makes him see 
things differently: “Of course, immigration gives me great freedom of 
movement as a writer and as a journalist. It is the telescope, the keyhole 
through which I can see the outside world.” Portante even argued that 
this position results in something more than just being in two worlds: 
“You are becoming something new, you are neither this nor that. […] We 
have another point of view, another perspective on things when we are 
not entirely submerged in them.” 
According to the Czech-Norwegian writer Michael Konupek, “It is not 
only the transitional situation – leaving one country and settling in 
another – but this transitional feeling remains a key theme of your life 
because it becomes a spiritual condition.” The Istanbul-born, Turkish-
Greek-Norwegian film-maker Annie Geelmuyden Pertan sees this state 
as the basis for her having become European: “I am what? I’m really 
nothing. I don’t belong anywhere. I’m half Norwegian – I only lived in 
Norway seven years of my life. I’m half Greek – I live in Turkey. That’s 
why I said I don’t belong anywhere. I’m a European citizen, let’s say.” All 
of which goes to show that immigrants could be at the forefront of 
‘building Europe’: supposedly marginal positions and perspectives could 
form the basis of a newly emerging Europe based on diversity. As Möller 
claimed: “I think migrants are the avant-garde of Europe. […] And I think 
this is the future.” The British-Indian film-maker Sarjit Bains portrays 
immigrants’ trajectories as a European dream analogous to the 
American dream: “I’m sure there’s a European dream for immigrants, 
and a lot of immigrants have achieved that European dream.”
Although all those interviewed argued in favour of immigration and 
the positive influence it had exercised on their own work and lives by 
shaping new and multiple perspectives and identities, they were aware 
of the challenges and problems. Bains illustrated this point by citing the 
British example: “Britain feels very scared of immigration. You know, 
they feel that at any time we’re going to be overthrown by thousands of 
people, and that kind of hasn’t changed.” The Istanbul-born, Greek-
Armenian writer Petros Markaris argued that incorporating diversity 
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into European society is a pressing challenge for a European cultural 
policy: “The Europeans have to be open enough to say that what we 
have now has been achieved by the participation of others, of 
immigrants. But it’s not enough if they accept it openly; they have to 
integrate it culturally.” However, there are serious challenges to be 
overcome, particularly by the non-immigrant or majority populations. 
“No majority, let’s say, tends to accept multiculturalism. […] In general, 
people love uniformity. They love compact things. And they look at the 
Other as a crack in that uniformity. And they do not want cracks.” 
An open-minded and diverse cultural policy, it was argued, could 
help to create an inclusive environment that would make Europe safe 
for immigration and cultural diversity. Yet it is not only culture that 
matters, but also politics in general, and citizenship politics in particular. 
The exclusive politics of naturalisation and citizenship no longer match 
Europe’s reality. Both the Russian-German writer Wladimir Kaminer and 
Özdamar suggested that citizenship policies need to be reformed to 
make Europe fit for its current and future diversity. Kaminer portrayed 
his ideal of citizenship in a fairly ironic mode: “My political vision would 
be multiple citizenship. You could have several states to choose from 
without having to move, without emigrating. States would function like 
service providers, like telephone companies.” 
Özdamar also set her hopes on multiple citizenship as a solution to 
problems of exclusion: “Well, I always said: ‘You need 18 passports. Two 
are not enough.’ You never know who did what to whom in history or 
will do so in future. That’s why we should have a passport report in the 
morning, right after the weather report, where to go with which passport 
today. It would be wonderful. When a Frenchman travels to Algeria, say, 
he could do that with his Dutch or his Turkish passport. It would be a 
wonderful solution.”
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Bringing Migration into the Historical Equation
Europe’s political and historical discourse about belonging and 
migration is not least a discourse about historical and narrative 
inclusion and exclusion. The dominant, victorious form for constructing 
belonging used to be the homogeneous nation as a strong force for 
building collective cohesion. The nation-state acted as its legal and 
political tool and national history as legitimising narratives. Nation-
states formed national identities based on national narratives. Nation, 
nation-state, and national narratives have developed into 
interdependent forces ever since the late 18th century, when nations and 
nation-states emerged as the ruling political categories in Europe. 
Minorities, whether ethnic or immigrant, usually served to demarcate 
lines of exclusion. However, the triadic nexus of nation, nation-state, 
and national narratives came increasingly under attack in the second 
half of the 20th century, coinciding with increasing levels of migration. 
Labour migration, humanitarian migration, and migration related to 
decolonisation re-shaped Europe’s ethno-demographic fabric, its 
constituency and thus its polity. Diversification became an ever 
increasing, albeit controversial, social and political force in Europe. This 
social and cultural reality of diversity and hybridity is currently about to 
generate new historical narratives.
Immigration is an omnipresent phenomenon of human history. 
There is no history without mobility and migration. “Migration is the 
history of mankind,” argued Kaminer. “It is something that always goes 
on, because people continually migrate, travel throughout the world. It 
is this movement which makes the earth keep rotating.” Regarding the 
European case, Portante stated: “Of course, all of European history is 
made up of departures and arrivals. It does not exist without that.” 
However, mainstream narratives do not portray things like this, as 
Markaris argued: “There has always been immigration. It’s not anything 
new. However, I think we look at it as if it was new, but it’s not.” What is 
still missing is the normality of recognising and tackling this fact not 
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only politically, but also historically. Instead of narrative inclusiveness, 
the phenomenon of ‘othering’ immigrants and labelling them 
collectively as strangers dominates the public discourse. In the case of 
Great Britain, Bains observed: “If it’s not the Jamaicans or if it’s not the 
Indians, now it’s the Eastern Europeans.”
European history and contemporary practices provide rich evidence 
of how exclusionary practices are continuously perpetuated. Portante 
argued that we have to look back to the 1950s to understand these 
patterns and mechanisms of exclusion: “The Italians were not welcome 
– they were like the Arabs in today’s France, like the Turks in today’s 
Germany, the Romanians in Italy.” Breaking through these patterns 
means bringing history into the equation, as Kapllani remarked: “From 
some point onwards, Europe will deal successfully with immigration, 
but it won’t deal successfully with it if [Europeans] deny the history of 
immigration, if they don’t see it as an integral part of their own history.” 
Markaris made a strong plea for a common European effort to achieve 
this goal: “Maybe we could sit down and say and discuss: ‘How do we 
bring our diversity, how do we bring our different experiences together 
to create a common experience and common politics?’ It needs 
discussion. It needs an open discussion, then working through the 
results.” 
Not surprisingly, the interviewees argued in favour of creating 
inclusive European narratives that would incorporate the immigrant 
experience. Doing so would involve more than just telling the history of 
migration as a separate chapter and adding it to national history. It goes 
far beyond this, and points to new forms of history that would intersect 
with various levels of existing narratives, linking migration to the past 
experiences of Europeans, and seeking to uncover the universal 
messages these experiences can convey. Fouad Laroui argued that the 
historical narratives of immigrants, as well as non-immigrant 
Europeans, need to be put into a communicative framework. A fertile 
ground for such cross-communication could be the history of 
migrations, both overseas and within Europe. The Spanish-Egyptian 
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film-maker Basel Ramses Labib illustrated this idea in relation to Spain: 
“An intersection of history and immigration is to make an analysis or 
films or research about similar experiences of Spaniards who left Spain 
and went to Germany, France or Switzerland, in order to work during the 
1950s and the 1960s, and the immigrants who currently come to work in 
Spain [or Europe].” Laroui went even further, suggesting that the 
historical experiences of migration be universalised: “We should 
immediately ask ourselves the universal question, that question of what 
kind of humanity is in immigration. It’s only then that we can see the 
extraordinary richness of this experience.” 
Does European history need to be enlarged by experiences of 
immigration to make the continent a better, fairer, and more inclusive 
place? The respondents overwhelmingly agreed that it does. However, 
there were also some critical remarks warning that the very status of 
‘being an immigrant’ should not eternally be prolonged and thus 
petrified. History should not place and keep people in small 
commemorative boxes. It is worth remembering Laroui’s somewhat 
ironic comment: “We are only immigrants in the eyes of others. I do not 
see myself as an immigrant when I wake up in the morning. When I 
shave in front of the mirror, I do not see an immigrant. I see myself.” 
Rainer Ohliger is co-founder and board member of the Network Migration 
in Europe. Ohliger’s main field of expertise is historical and international 
migration, (public) representation of migrants and minorities, and interethnic 
relations. Among his publications are European Encounters: Migrants, 
Migration and European Societies since 1945, Aldershot: Ashgate, 2003 
(co-edited with Karen Schönwälder and Triadafilos Triadafilopoulos); and 
Cross Over Geschichte: Historisches Bewusstsein Jugendlicher in der 
Einwanderungsgesellschaft, Hamburg: edition Körber, 2009 (co-edited with 
Viola Georgi). 
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Stories that Matter 
Niña Weijers
Whether Europe is a reality that we 
cannot avoid, or whether Europe already 
no longer exists: the urgency of the 
discussion hardly seems to permit a 
middle course that transcends this 
antithesis.




Every time the Romanian author György Dragomán crosses a border 
within Europe he is beset by a sense of disbelief: How can it be this 
simple? The reality of his youth – in Romania under the repressive 
communist regime of Ceauşescu – where it seemed impossible that the 
Iron Curtain would ever fall, is still stronger than the current reality, in 
which the Iron Curtain has actually fallen. This conveys something of 
the inexplicability of great upheavals in history, but it also says 
something about the physical presence of history in our present – in this 
instance so physical that the present is perceived almost as a fiction. 
“We may not be strong enough to live in the present,” the American 
author Saul Bellow once wrote. He has a point here: our present is 
characterised by a constant glancing backward and looking ahead. At 
the same time the ‘now’ is all we have, and escape is not an option even 
if we wish for it. When Dragomán travels across Europe and is astounded 
by the relativity of the national frontiers, he is confronted with this very 
field of tension, this crossroads of past and future, where the present – 
in all its complexity – is always the only option.
If a Europe appears on the horizon, then which Europe is it and to 
whom does it belong? In the spring of 2011, the European Cultural 
Foundation (ECF) and the SPUI25 academic-cultural centre invited ten 
authors and thinkers from Europe and beyond to talk about this. The 
question was posed at a moment when the Greek government still had 
Papandreou at its helm, Berlusconi was still sitting more or less firmly in 
the saddle, and the survival of the Euro (and the EU, for that matter) was 
not the urgent question it has now become. 
In the current debate, it is the economy by which Europe’s degree of 
unity or division is measured, and not so very undeservedly. This debate 
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seems to be characterised by a division between Europhiles and 
Eurosceptics. Whether Europe is a reality that we cannot avoid, or 
whether Europe already no longer exists: the urgency of the discussion 
hardly seems to permit a middle course that transcends this antithesis. 
And that when right now it is useful, if not necessary, to challenge that 
discrepancy, which usually arises as an absolute. Polarisation is 
simplification, and thus dangerous. The invited authors already 
concurred about this six months ago. The following presents a selection 
from their musings. 
Being European
 
A true European, the Danish author Jens Christian Grøndahl 
observed, is someone who has absolutely no desire to be a European. If 
Europe does not speak to us because we hold the view that we would 
rather possess a national or even a regional identity, then that is a very 
European notion. Even someone who deems Europe too small, too narrow 
or too myopic in the light of global politics and culture cannot avoid the 
fact that this idea is very European in nature. Consider phenomena such 
as democracy and equality before the law: by definition they strive for 
universality, while at the same time they are inextricably (and 
characteristically) embedded in European thought. Kant may have 
dreamt of a global community of free, enlightened individuals, but he 
simultaneously defined himself as a European pur sang. 
According to Grøndahl, being European is a paradoxical kind of 
identity that continuously shifts between the local and the international, 
the progressive and the conservative, between diversity and 
homogeneity. Moreover, these variables are themselves ambiguous in 
nature: in its homogeneity the international can be just as conservative 
as what we regard as ‘old-fashioned’ nationalism, whereas a 
nationalistic refusal by the citizen to be erased by the international 
market can in fact be indicative of progress. For him, the paradoxical 
identity which belongs to that being European should not be neutralised. 
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Indeed it cannot be neutralised, for it is the ambiguity itself which 
creates the condition of possibility. 
In Grøndahl’s view, the use of the term ‘identity’ remains problematic 
in this context, because it refers to ‘being identical to yourself’. It 
presupposes unity and the belief in essence and, invariably, to remain 
the same. Yet that is precisely what the ambiguous nature which 
underpins our being European precludes. There is no shared core that 
binds us; what we share is sooner a permanent non-sharing, and 
inherent to that negation is the existence of an opportunity to share 
something. A shared European identity, no less than a national identity, 
is a myth. It is a sentimentality rather than a social reality: what we 
clutch at if the world seems too capricious, too big or too strange, and 
the future too uncertain.
Grøndahl is by no means alone in calling this kind of myth creation 
into question. Joep Leerssen, Professor of Modern European Literature at 
the University of Amsterdam (UvA), spoke about the identity myth 
which taints the narrative of Europe as well. For Leerssen, in Europe 
there is a propensity to regard the continent itself as an identity, as 
something with a will and an agenda: the continent of progress, of the 
development of science and art, of “man’s emergence from his self-
imposed immaturity,” to quote Kant once more. But a narrative is 
misleading if the protagonist is something other than an individual. 
Continents, nations, and societies do indeed have a history, but when 
something they do not possess is attributed to them – a mind of their 
own, a personality, intentionality – then that history ends up being 
confused with something that is strictly individual, strictly human. 
The danger that lurks in this myth of a narrative of collective identity 
corresponds with what Grøndahl outlined earlier: the temptation to 
define history based on essential characteristics, and thus with essential 
contradistinctions. In other words, this is the peril of melodrama, which 
reduces European history to a conflict between modernity, democracy, 
tolerance, and progress on the one hand, and all their attendant 
negatives on the other. It is a story based on the contrast (magnified or 
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otherwise) between good and evil; a story, therefore, that is highly 
efficient from a rhetorical perspective – populist politics continues to 
thrive on it – yet allows no leeway for the reality of a complex world full 
of irreducible ambiguities. For to be fair, the Enlightenment also brought 
dictatorship, Romanticism fed the nationalistic sentiment, and even the 
anti-democratic, anti-cosmopolitan regime of the Nazis was imposed 
using hypermodern means.
Cultural Boundaries
To state that discrepancies within complex narratives are not 
absolute does not imply that their differences are neutralised. Those 
who assert that it ultimately does not matter whether you veer left or 
right (because everything is relative) are actually rendering harmless 
those concepts such as left, right, progressive, conservative, tolerant, 
and xenophobic, and can at best be termed cynics. Differences, even if 
they are temporary rather than definitive in nature, are what makes it 
possible to talk about Europe at all, to conduct politics, to write novels. 
The Dutch author Nelleke Noordervliet subscribes to this when she 
quotes a pronouncement about Europe by the 19th-century Swiss art 
historian Jacob Burckhardt: “Was uns bedroht ist die Zwangseinheit, was 
uns rettet ist unsere Vielfalt” (‘What threatens us is the forced unity, 
what saves us is our diversity’). Noordervliet imagines Europe as a quilt, 
in which each individual piece retains its own identity in the process of 
integration into the greater whole. 
The Greek author and publisher Takis Theodoropoulos examines the 
history of that ‘forced unity’ of Europe more closely. He argues that 
since the 1950s a new Europe has been premised on the idea that 
nobody wanted to experience a nightmare like the Second World War 
ever again. The political frontiers were defined by allowing only the 
nations with a democratic government to join. In addition, the new 
Europe distanced itself from its colonial past, of which it was ashamed, 
to cast off its cultural arrogance of yore: ‘the equality of all cultures’ 
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became Europe’s new creed. People truly believed that the dust and dirt 
of the past could be buried, that a brand-new structure would arise from 
it. According to Theodoropoulos, multiculturalism and tolerance in fact 
became a cloak for a new form of indifference and even racism, which 
erased the colonial past.
Nigerian author Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie – the only non-European 
speaker among those invited – made a similar point. She highlighted the 
fact that the current European narrative about Africa is a tale of 
benevolence and aid, a narrative that is almost completely divorced from 
the colonial past. As if Europe were to acknowledge the past in all its 
complexity, then Europeans would be held personally responsible for it. 
According to Adichie, it is remarkable that Europe acknowledges that the 
period of the Enlightenment still ties in closely with today’s institutions 
and our thinking about the nation-state, while denying that its past in 
Africa, barely 60 years ago, has any relevant link with the present.
The damage that this policy of effacement has inflicted is, according 
to Theodoropoulos, now apparent. The new Europe is afraid of cultural 
frontiers, generally regarding them as a necessary evil, and thus as 
something which must be overcome. That obviously applies in some 
cases, such as the Berlin Wall or the Green Line dividing Cyprus that still 
cuts through Nicosia, but cultural boundaries are necessary, if we want 
to preserve our European capital. We don’t all want to speak the same 
homogeneous ‘airport English’, just as we don’t want to live in a world 
where everyone eats the same food, sings the same songs, and dresses 
identically. 
Theodoropoulos regards the desire to eradicate such cultural 
boundaries as going hand in glove with the wish to forget the less than 
wonderful aspects of the European past, because we associate this past 
with the concepts of nationalism and cultural arrogance that leave us 
with a bitter taste. In effect this mirrors, to return to Leerssen’s words, 
proclivity for melodrama; for a simplified version of the past, in which 
good and evil are each other’s counterpoles and even the evil seems to be 
ineradicable. 
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This is a consequence of the increasingly popular assumption that 
the past is a burden that Europe does not need. It is, Theodoropoulos 
notes, as if we were the ones who invented democracy, or tolerance. Our 
democracy may well differ considerably from the democracy of the 
Athens of the 5th century BC, but that is still where its foundations lie. 
We are, in other words, gradually forgetting that even this 
institutionalised European phenomenon of democracy started out as an 
experiment. 
Theodoropoulos believes that this presents a major problem. We 
take too much for granted and hardly ever think beyond what is 
generally accepted and the security of institutions. Europe has lost its 
urge to experiment, he concludes, which is an absolutely necessary 
precondition if we really want to create something. Following in 
Grøndahl’s footsteps, he therefore proposes that we stop talking about 
European identity, that which already exists and is taken for granted, 
and instead proceed from an attitude that critically investigates itself 
and adapts itself continually. 
The British author and literature scholar Adam Thirlwell has also 
subjected Europe’s diversity, and the cultural capital that resides within 
it, to a more probing examination. Proceeding from something that 
Milan Kundera formulated, he decides that Europe is a continent with 
‘maximum diversity in minimum space.’ It is a model for the high-speed 
Internationale and at the same time a locus of nationalism and 
xenophobia, offering a glimpse of the ‘purest’ form of internationality to 
be found in the European bureaucracy of politics and economics, yet on 
the other hand the nationalistic prevails in our everyday, personal 
environment. And then there is something known as ‘European culture’, 
that curious supranational history of art, literature, and music. But 
what does that European culture actually entail, Thirlwell wonders, or, 
more specifically, the European novel? For him this phrasing of the 
question mirrors a broader political question: Who does Europe belong 
to? 
Thirlwell argues that the European novel finds itself in a field of 
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tension. Literature is the art of language and languages are national and 
specific, and in the great majority of cases literature does not straddle 
frontiers. Initially that is not consistent with the idea of an international 
novel, but when that novel is translated it certainly starts to become 
part of the international. However, the effect of translation not only 
democratises; it also homogenises and excludes: in European literature 
(just as in European bureaucracy) the more or less coincidentally 
triumphant English, French, and German predominate, so that several 
more minor languages – and authors – remain sorely underexposed. 
In a utopian thought experiment, Thirlwell imagines a form of the 
European novel that remedies the difference between major and minor 
languages, between the politically powerful and the politically weaker 
languages. A truly democratic practice of translation, in which 
translation does not depart from the original but instead involves 
producing translations of translations, resulting in a chain of translations 
and re-translations that do not proceed from the original (a Spaniard 
makes a Spanish translation of an English translation of a Polish book, 
etc.). A kiosk of literature where the ranking of the original work above 
the translation has no need to exist, given that the translation is no 
longer a derivative but a new original. A place where the entities ‘centre’ 
and ‘periphery’ prove to be moveable and therefore relative, rather than 
fixed quantities. In other words, an imperfect, rough, amateurish, 
numinous, and essentially democratic approach to the European novel. 
An opportunity for internationalism without tyranny. 
Internationality without tyranny: this is reminiscent of what 
Grøndahl conceptualised as being European without the static 
essentialism of identity and of Leerssen’s notion of a European narrative 
without melodrama. This is what Theodoropoulos meant when he 
stated that Europe is not an immutable entity but an attitude, and it is 
Noordervliet’s quilt. It is a mode of thinking that, no matter how 
divergent the lines of approach, acquires relevance in the field of tension 
that is Europe and refrains from attempting to neutralise this. Here we 
have György Dragomán who stands at a European border and crosses it, 
without forgetting that doing this is in fact an impossibility.
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Niña Weijers studied Literature in Amsterdam and Dublin. She published 
short stories in magazines such as Passionate and De Gids and contributed to 
several literary events and festivals. She is currently working on her first novel, 
which she combines with her job as a programmer for the academic-cultural 
centre SPUI25. In this function, she helped to organise the series Narratives for 
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My argument here is that graphic 
narrative and Europe share a common 
spatial imagination.
Graphic Narratives of Europe Jason Dittmer
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Graphic Narratives of Europe
In this short essay I will argue for an emphasis on graphic narrative 
(e.g., bande dessinée, comics, graphic novels, etc.) in future attempts to 
narrate the European project, either in European Union cultural policy 
or in private enterprise. I will do so by first noting the particular 
difficulties of narrating Europe, in particular the historical and linguistic 
challenges as well as the need to avoid replicating past racisms and 
exclusions by narrating a plural and outward-facing polity. Following 
this, I will outline the role of space in graphic narrative, for the purpose 
of juxtaposing these properties with the way space is imagined within 
the EU. My argument here is that graphic narrative and Europe share a 
common spatial imagination. Finally, I identify a few genres of story that 
reflect particular visions of Europe before offering one, the everyday, as 
particularly helpful in narrating an outward-facing, understandable 
Europe.
The Problem
The narrative of Europe in the post-war era has long been one of 
increasing prosperity and stability, serving as a powerful source of 
diplomatic ‘soft’ power and as a unifying identity in the wake of the 
Cold War. In contrast, the more recent narrative of Europe has been less 
positive, with the limits of EU expansion putatively reached and fiscal 
crisis in Europe threatening to drag down the global economic recovery. 
The narrative has shifted from one of the incorporation of ‘new’ areas 
into Europe to one of fragmentation. Schisms among European states, 
such as those between immigrant-sending and immigrant-receiving 
states, and between the fiscally sound and those in need of a ‘bail-out’, 
threaten to undercut the positive image of Europe both in its Member 
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States and beyond. The current crisis only highlights the flaw previously 
perceived by Eurosceptics: a technocratic elitism that sees democracy as 
a problem to be surmounted rather than as a fundamental source of 
legitimate power. Given this, the danger is that new attempts to narrate 
Europe might attempt to tap into exclusionary, monolithic nationalist or 
racist visions in order to legitimise the European project. 
Narratives of Europe have never been easy to produce, at least not 
unambiguously positive ones. The history of intra-European conflict is 
well-documented, and in some ways defined the twentieth century. The 
experience of past hegemony is problematic as a basis for narrative not 
only because of its racist underpinnings, but also because some parts of 
Europe (Ireland, Poland, etc.) experienced imperialism through the lens 
of the colonised rather than as an outward-looking experience. Because 
of this history, narratives of European commonality have tended 
towards artistic, philosophical, and scientific achievement, a ‘common 
heritage’ of intellectual interchange among the peoples of Europe that 
may not have much traction with broad swaths of the population. 
Attempts to narrate Europe also struggle because of its sheer 
linguistic diversity (23 official languages at last count). Critics claim that 
the lack of European-wide media (largely a result of its linguistic 
diversity) prevents a collective sense of ‘us’ from emerging. Others argue 
that this diversity is the only possible way forward, as any attempt at 
linguistic convergence would cause popular support for the EU to 
disappear overnight. The Culture 2000 and Media 2007 programmes of 
the European Commission have attempted to produce a unified cultural 
space in hopes of fostering this ‘us’ in the face of continued linguistic 
diversity. 
For instance, the Media 2007 programme has recently contributed to 
the co-production by Swedish and Danish television producers of a 
television show called The Bridge, which paired a Danish and Swedish 
detective on a murder case that began with a body found at the midway 
point of the Øresund/Öresund Bridge that connects the two countries. 
Importantly, Swedish and Danish are closely related and are mutually 
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intelligible to some extent. Indeed, one of the in-jokes of the show is the 
mutual complaining between the Copenhagen and Malmö police 
departments about pronunciation of common words. The bilingualism 
of the show, combined with its demonstration of teamwork across 
national borders, clearly marks the show as representing a common 
European space. Of course, I watched the show fully subtitled in London, 
the show having been sold on to the BBC, adding another dimension to 
the show’s credentials as a pop culture artefact circulating through a 
common European space. Still, such television shows are expensive and 
dependent on the high degree of regional cohesion characteristic of 
Scandinavia. Further, such shows can never fully surmount the 
linguistic diversity of Europe: the humour dependent on knowledge of 
Swedish/Danish accents was completely lost on viewers viewing with 
subtitles. How might graphic narrative enter into these efforts to narrate 
Europe in ways that generate broader enthusiasm for the European 
project in cost-effective ways? 
The Form of Graphic Narrative
There are two elements to the form of graphic narrative that are 
crucial to my argument: the way it combines images and words into a 
single medium, and the way it is composed out of a montage of panels. 
With regard to the former, there are interesting tensions at work in 
graphic narrative. First, we describe the consumption of graphic 
narrative as an act of reading, although it is clearly as much about looking 
as it is about reading. This is because the images in graphic narrative are 
juxtaposed with one another in a way that we read as a story that 
unfolds over time. But lest we imagine graphic narrative as simply a text 
to be read, it is worth considering its nature in another way: while it is 
possible to imagine graphic narrative with no words at all, it is 
impossible to imagine one with no images. Rather than trying to resolve 
this tension one way or another, it is fruitful to set it aside and accept 
graphic narrative as both image and text, with the images carrying much 
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of the load in the production of a story over time. 
If the first element of graphic narrative is how we read it within a 
single panel (by both reading the text and looking at the image) then the 
second is about how we make sense of the many panels that confront 
us on a given page. The space between panels is known as the gutter, 
and it serves as the signal to a reader that the panels on either side of it 
are meant to be understood as distinct images. But in what order are 
panels meant to be ‘read’?  A simple reading (often signalled by reference 
to graphic narrative as ‘sequential art’) would assume that the artist has 
an order in mind, and it is up to the reader to figure it out using clues 
left in the comic by the artist. However, to think of graphic narrative this 
way is to lump it in with other sequential media such as writing and 
film, treating panels like words or filmic frames. Considering graphic 
narrative as its own form, however, calls our attention to other ways of 
thinking about panels. 
Panels exist not only in relationship to the panel ‘before’ and ‘after’ 
it, but in what can be called a topology – a set of relationships of varying 
intensity – produced through the act of reading. For instance, all panels 
ever printed have a basic relationship with one another, namely that 
they are all panels in graphic narrative. Panels in a single comic book or 
graphic novel share another relationship: existing in the same material 
‘book’. Panels on the same page share another relationship, modulated 
by readers’ perceptions that some panels are meant to be following on 
from other panels. Further, panels have relationships not only with 
those that precede or follow them but also with others, in the same 
graphic narrative or further afield, that they reference, ape, satirise, and 
so on. Therefore, a web of relationships can be traced not only though a 
single page or comic, but through the entire archive of comics that have 
ever been published. These relationships may be intended by artists and 
writers, or not, but they are brought into existence through the act of 
reading.
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Imagining a European Space
What does this have to do with the European project? There are two 
ways in which graphic narrative connects with the desire of some 
political elites for culture to suture Europe together. First, because so 
much of the burden of telling the story is borne by the images, graphic 
narrative is an excellent medium for circulating among various 
linguistic communities, with the small amounts of text in speech and 
thought bubbles digitally erased and new translations inserted. There 
are of course problems: namely that speech bubbles (for dialogue) are 
often sized and shaped for the text in the original language, and that 
sometimes the words are drawn into the image (in, for example, the sign 
above a store entrance) and therefore cannot be digitally replaced. Still, 
in comparison to other media, graphic narrative is relatively easy to 
translate into multiple languages for multiple markets, and there are 
numerous success stories to emulate, such as Hergé’s Tintin comics and 
Jack Chick’s evangelical cartoons. Therefore, just as The Bridge worked to 
tell a European story through the exploitation of linguistic similarity in 
Denmark and Sweden, graphic narrative can work through the 
exploitation of a language common to all: the visual.
The second way in which graphic narrative connects with the 
European project draws directly on the EU’s conceptualisation of space. 
The European Spatial Planning and Observation Network (ESPON) is an 
EU think-tank that seeks to understand spatial patterns in Europe; 
crucially, however, some understandings of European space are idealised 
and promoted. ESPON’s favoured vision incorporates a range of kinds of 
space: territorial, scalar, and networked. I will explain each in turn. 
The territorial vision of Europe emphasises the borders of the EU, 
seeing them as a key divide between the inside and outside. This is, 
perhaps, the most obvious form of European space, and one that is most 
linked to traditional nation-states (just as comics are neither pure text 
nor pure image, the EU is neither pure state nor pure international 
organisation, but a hybrid of both). Another dimension to this spatial 
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imagination is scalar – emphasising the influence and interests of the 
EU beyond its borders, as manifest in (for example) the European 
Neighbourhood Policy (ENP). Finally, the networked spatiality links 
specific places within the EU with other places, both in the EU and 
beyond. This can be seen, for example, in the way that corporate 
regulations legislated in Brussels de facto regulate other markets 
because of the global importance of the European single market. 
These three spatialities can be found in my above description of the 
topology of graphic narrative: one might imagine the space of a single 
comic as territorial space, while its relationships to all others with the 
same title, and all others in the same genre, might be understood as 
scalar relationships. Finally, the relationships of various intensities 
between various panels might be considered a networked space, 
sprawling across borders without regard for traditional understandings 
of territory and sovereignty. Because of this ‘spatial congruence’ between 
the forms of both graphic narrative and Europe, it makes sense to think 
of graphic narrative as a medium that embeds within it a mode of 
thinking about space that might foster a ‘European’ attitude of multiple, 
simultaneous identities and connections through space.
European Graphic Narrative
Having made this link between graphic narrative and Europe, one 
question remains: what kind of stories to tell? Being a terrible storyteller, 
I am loath to speak much on this question. Still, I feel obliged to offer 
some thoughts which truly creative people should feel free to disregard.
Given the cultural moment in which we live, in which American 
superheroes fill the cinema, it would be tempting to adapt the largely 
American superhero genre to our purposes by creating a European 
nationalist superhero whose adventures might adorn our graphic 
narrative. This would be a mistake. The nationalist superhero has, as a 
genre, struggled to speak to the plural nature of any nation, and in the 
case of Europe this is of the greatest importance. If such a path is to be 
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trodden, it would be better to follow in the model of Alpha Flight and The 
99, two superhero comics that are about a team coming together, 
allowing for diversity and respect to emerge organically from the 
storyline (the teams are Canadian and Muslim, respectively). Still, the 
nationalist superhero genre’s conventions articulate a particular 
relationship between legitimacy and violence that is troubling, 
especially in light of the aims and objectives of the European project.
Instead, I would offer the suggestion that a European form of graphic 
narrative should follow different generic conventions, particularly those 
associated with the analysis of everyday life. Graphic narrative about 
everyday life has emerged as a significant genre, emphasising not only 
ordinary events (rather than extraordinary events ‘worthy’ of narration), 
but also the haziness of cause and effect, as well as the boredom and 
‘spaces between’ significant events. This may seem a strange choice for 
a European narrative, but it has several advantages. First, by portraying 
‘everyday’ European lives, it is possible to show Europe in a 
comprehensible and non-heroic light to which others (including non-
Europeans) can relate. Therefore it gestures towards inclusion rather 
than exclusion. These points of connection between lives in various 
European (and non-European) sites can be portrayed through the 
topological space of the page itself; just as the connections to any given 
panel are multiple and heterogeneous, so are the connections to any 
European life.
Conclusions
In this brief essay I have argued for graphic narrative as a medium 
especially suited to the production of new European narratives. My 
argument has hinged on the hybrid nature of graphic narrative as both 
text and image, and on the topological relationships among both the 
panels of a graphic narrative as well as the various sites and nodes of 
European space. Such congruence may seem too abstract to be useful. 
But the reading of graphic narrative necessitates the bridging of gutters 
119
and the creation of a coherent entity out of a fragmented space. Isn’t 
this what the European project is ultimately about? Inculcating such 
habits among Europeans must advance the European project, and doing 
so amongst non-Europeans can help to promote European influence 
abroad. This openness to the outside world is a crucial element of any 
new European narrative, and to that end I have offered up narratives of 
everyday life as a genre worthy of promotion. Rather than tales of 
heroism that remind readers of past imperialism, European everyday 
life (including its connections to non-European lives) might serve as a 
powerful attractor around which new European politics can emerge.
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Museums in Movement? 
Mobilities and Migration in Current Exhibitions in Europe 
Migrants on their way to Europe and crossing the Southern and 
Eastern EU borders have been the focus of EU policy-makers and the EU 
border control agency FRONTEX, of NGOs, international media, and 
public spheres for quite some years. Each person arriving on a 
Mediterranean island – be it Lampedusa or Lesbos – has his or her 
individual story to tell about the reasons for moving. Simultaneously 
there is a geopolitical context that brings unsolved questions of 
citizenship, human rights, and belonging to the fore. Currently, and in 
addition to that, not only Greek observers consider the current crisis as 
a catalyst of human movement comparable to the vast waves of 
emigration that characterised Europe during the 19th century. Migration 
inside the EU and beyond co-exists with other significant forms of 
mobility such as the ‘Easy-Jet-Set’ and long-distance commuting due to 
wage differentials and diverging legislation inside the EU. Mobility is 
simply everywhere around us: as a fundamental condition of life, as a 
global phenomenon that policies attempt to ‘manage’, and as an ideal 
that influences ideas of ‘successful’ cosmopolitan biographies.
How is this reflected in one of the most immobile but nonetheless 
influential cultural institutions Europe has produced – namely the 
museum? More and more museums all over Europe and inside the EU in 
particular are discovering migration as a topic for exhibitions. A number 
of museums on migration have been founded or are meant to be 
established since the end of the twentieth century in France, the United 
Kingdom, Germany, Scandinavia and elsewhere. How and why is this 
phenomenon being showcased in temporary exhibitions? Temporary 
exhibitions are expected to be more courageous than permanent ones 
when it comes to a provocative thesis or metaphor. They may set trends, 
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new ways of thinking about society – and provoke productive 
disturbances. Although national politics and histories vary, these 
exhibitions have a role to play within a pan-European debate on 
European societies’ relation to migration. 
Migration is a topic accompanied by so many – in part mutually 
exclusive – expectations that criticism from one side or the other is 
guaranteed; it also challenges traditional principles of the museum that 
link objects to places. Therefore, temporary migration exhibitions do 
already influence work behind the scenes of museums. 
Blurring Effects, Objects, and the Circularity of 
Europeanisation
The topic of migration challenges the ways in which museums have 
traditionally operated. Firstly, migration as an exhibition topic blurs the 
imagined nation-states and consequently Europe. Today people, ideas, 
goods, but also conflicts evolve and move transnationally – we might 
find this so encompassing and normal that we take it for granted. And 
yet, the nation-state is still a powerful actor beyond the surface of 
everyday life, something which the reintroduction of national border 
controls by some countries inside the EU and the Schengen area in 
2011/12 reminds us of. This retrogressive move shows the political 
interest in regulating migration at a time marked by both an economic 
crisis and an ever increasing number of immigrants and transit 
migrants, especially from Northern Africa, crossing the outside borders 
of the Schengen area. What we see around creates a (potentially 
enriching) confusion for the museum, an institution invented precisely 
to help construct the nation as a meaningful point of reference and as a 
category to organise the world. 
Secondly, the way in which migration questions the nation can be 
observed in the ways objects are selected for museum showcases. 
Collections are most frequently organised in a way that links objects to 
a geographical place. This invites both comparisons over time and 
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comparisons between two or more places – but also veils movements 
across borders that might be equally characteristic of those objects. 
Objects without a genuine geographical place do not easily fit into such 
traditional collection systems, and it is through them that we find the 
hidden norms of collection systems. 
In contrast to traditional questions – ‘Where was this thing invented, 
produced, used?’  – other aspects become relevant and justify its 
inclusion in a display: ‘What does this thing tell us about ideas on the 
move, about human beings, knowledge or conflicts in movement?’ The 
shift that is indicated by such questions highlights the changing role of 
objects. Does migration steer museums towards employing objects as 
symbols rather than as epistemic objects – things provoke new 
questions? Mobility makes it more difficult to place objects and to fit 
them into traditional collection systems. 
These two aspects consequently lead to a more general, third, 
dimension: not only the nation as the historical paradigm of the 
museum is challenged, but also the place and space that a certain 
museum and its displays relate to, be it the city, the region, the nation or 
Europe. If mobility and migration are in focus, these seemingly well-
defined entities are undermined or ask at least for redefinition under 
new auspices. There probably is not just one answer to the question 
what the EU and Europe are, but many – and these answers are both 
provisional and entail even further questions. Isn’t that an ideal ground 
for temporary exhibitions? Together with museums of migration, they 
navigate in this contested field of Europeanisation, and they do so along 
with political parties and activists, scientists from various disciplines, 
media and public opinion. Because of its European omnipresence, 
debates about migration reveal Europeans’ self-understanding. In this 
sense, migration exhibitions do indeed demand experimental 
approaches, both in aesthetics and narratives. Those may set their 
imprint on what we see in future museums.
Inside the museal field, the debate on how, where, why, and for 
whom museums of migration should be founded revolves around 
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objects, and specifically objects that have been donated by migrants or 
their families. These objects do often carry along some melancholy – 
something that creates difficulties for curators with a more theoretical 
approach who do not attempt to highlight the aura of an object, but 
rather see their exhibition as a political statement. For some curators, 
objects should provoke a kind of dialogue with the beholder, resulting in 
further questions rather than definite answers. It is hardly surprising 
that the material qualities of the ‘classic’ themselves hardly turn it into 
an object generating further questioning. The suitcase is used so 
frequently that it has turned into heavy luggage in itself and for some 
curators of migration exhibitions it has become a half-joking game to 
observe how and where suitcases have been included in the next 
upcoming display of migration (visitor research on this aspect is still 
outstanding).
Museums in Movement
‘Everyone’ within the museal world suddenly seems to put migration 
on display. In the UK, archives and museums jointly work for a more 
‘inclusive’ approach towards cultural heritage; in Germany, the local 
museums of history in Frankfurt and Stuttgart are being completely 
reconceptualised; the same applies to the city archive and museum in 
Munich. Museums in Scandinavia, in the Balkans, and in Greece are also 
turning their attention towards mobility. What are the reasons behind 
this phenomenon? Are they just pragmatic? Is it the search for new 
funding or for cooperation that is leading museums to focus on 
migration? Or is the aim to attract new, significantly younger and more 
diverse audiences? All of these aspects are of importance for the current 
focus on migration in museums. The degree to which this is the case 
depends on the urban (or rural) context of the respective museums and 
on how much the museums are dependent on external funding and 
cooperation for their survival.
Migration is a buzzword, and hardly any cultural institution in 
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Europe that seeks funding on the regional, national or EU level – be it in 
the field of performing or fine arts – can be successful without hinting 
at the migration dimension of the specific project or the impact on 
intercultural dialogue of its general activity. This trend is both to be 
welcomed and very general. However, the increasing presence and 
explicit mentioning of migration in museal displays also indicates some 
more fundamental changes that transcend the area of funding or 
cooperation contracts. Specifically, there seems to be a need to make the 
relation between a preserved past inside the museum and complex 
realities outside the museum more explicit, and focusing on migration 
is apparently an appropriate way to do this. 
Exactly the other way around, political activists, for example, use 
travelling exhibitions as a means to present their ideas to a broader 
audience – making use of the strengths of the medium ‘exhibition’ and 
its seemingly ‘detached’ nimbus. Thus, the open-air exhibition Traces 
from Lesvos through Europe that was held in the Migration Detention 
Centre at Paganí on the island of Lesbos, for instance, presented 
individual migrants with their dreams and plans for the future. The 
exhibition was anything but neutral or detached from political 
discourse.
Migration as a ‘hot’ topic object that involves various political views 
and thus implicates ongoing discussions might not force all museums 
to begin raising their voices in a debate about Europe and its societies, 
but it might very well strengthen the need for a clear and recognisable 
position that a museal institution takes in the discourse on migration. 
In line with MIGMAP – to give one example from the influential 
exhibition Projekt Migration in Cologne in 2005 – this means that 
museums might be asked to convert their hidden, traditional worldview 
into an explicit political position.
Maybe this is a farewell to the usual “dissociation, classification, 
storage, acquisition of meaning” (Henrietta Lidchi), i.e. the process 
traditionally applied to things on their way into the museum? The initial 
dissociation of things usually meant either spatial or temporal distance 
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from their origins. This is not applicable for our topic: neither time nor 
space separates migration and its objects from the European reality in 
2012. Quite on the contrary, exhibitions on migration reflect how the 
museal space opens up to current political debates that are anything 
but ‘dissociated’. Firstly, exhibitions have often functioned as an 
“outpost in the vast land of exemplification” (Walter Benjamin) – that is, 
a place where ongoing debates crystallise in a three-dimensional way. 
This is particularly the case with exhibitions on migration in Europe. 
Secondly, museums have also always been places where ideas about 
the future are presented if not generated. This holds especially true for 
our context: migration is a core field of EU politics, it represents a 
substantial challenge for any traditional understanding of nation-states, 
and it is certainly a phenomenon that brings questions of settledness 
and naturalisation, of identification and the impossibility of a singular 
European identity to the fore. These fundamental aspects were usually 
veiled behind the semblance of universalism and the way in which 
museums historically meant to represent the world in an ‘objective’ 
manner: they presented themselves as detached from ongoing political 
debates, commenting maybe from a distanced position outside. The 
museums and exhibitions we have seen, however, have moved away 
from this position: they are not outside, but – whether this is intended 
or not – in the very middle of a political process. In this sense, exhibitions 
on migration reflect how the process of musealisation is today 
accompanied by a more explicit demand of self-reflection and self-
positioning that museal institutions are provoked to undertake by the 
public, the media, funding institutions, other exhibitions that have been 
successful in one way or the other, and by political debate. Some current 
exhibitions reflect how a self-reflexive and budding version of 
cosmopolitanism that is closely linked to the concept of transnationalism 
is slowly but surely being incorporated into exhibitions: Europeanness.
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Exhibitions on Migration tell Several Stories at Once
Generated both from within and from discourses outside the museal 
field, exhibitions on migration question notions of objectivity or of 
European universalism. In doing so, they show how various public 
spheres and discourses interact, and thus encourage museums to play 
a more central role in the ongoing self-reflection of European societies. 
Exhibitions on migration tell several stories at once: firstly, they 
present stories of migration in a certain city, region or nation, and within 
a particular period of time. To a greater degree than other topics, 
migration unveils the constructed character of geographic or political 
entities such as the nation or the EU. It shows how, hidden below the 
norm of settledness, mobilities are and have always been omnipresent 
in and fundamental for European societies. 
Secondly, exhibitions on migration add a new chapter to the meta-
narrative of museums: implicitly, they challenge the relevance of the 
nation. More specifically, they challenge both the historical idea that 
initiated the invention of the public museum and the political 
fundament of European integration today. They provoke questions of 
contemporary globalisation phenomena that are equally implicitly put 
on display. The consequent effect is a blurring, or ‘un-writing’ (Irit 
Rogoff) of the concept of the nation-state. 
Finally, migration as a museal topic conveys a view on how the 
institution ‘museum’ relates to such a fuzzy thing as mobility, and it 
leads to a number of aspects that deserve the attention of both museum 
professionals and researchers. The underlying question – ‘What is being 
put on display, by whom, for whom, and for telling what kind of story?’ 
– may sound banal and commonplace, but answering it means to take 
up a position towards history and today’s political discourse.
Thus, exhibitions on migration contribute to a larger extent than 
other exhibitions to a meta-debate on the current role of museums in 
Western societies. They do so by contesting the predominant role 
commonly attributed to objects. Here, it will be interesting to see how 
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collection systems can be extended towards a greater attention for 
mobility. Finally, yet importantly, exhibitions on migration more often 
than not explicitly address future developments in society instead of 
reflecting primarily on the past. They do so by relating migration to 
urban developments as well as by placing (metaphorically speaking) 
national and European political discourses inside the showcase. 
Despite varying contexts, there are some traits that are common for 
many exhibitions. Their sometimes veiled, sometimes explicit gaze into 
the future has always characterised museums – here, it becomes 
explicit. It will be interesting to see how this will affect the museum as 
an institution embedded in urban space, in Europe, and yet aware of 
global phenomena.
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Re-drawing the Art Map of  ‘New Europe’
If you were asked who your favourite Eastern European artist of our 
times was, would you be able to name any?1 It would not surprise me if 
you could not. Contemporary Eastern European art was until recently 
virtually non-existent on the art map of Europe, which is yet another, 
even if less critical, side-effect of the Cold War’s ideological divisions. 
The battle of the narratives for Europe, however, is still being fought on 
all fronts. As marginal as it may seem in the grand scheme of things, art 
history makes no exception. Narratives about the visual arts of Europe’s 
former East have thus been proliferating since 1989. On the one hand, 
Central and Eastern European art evokes the historical turbulences this 
part of Europe has gone through; on the other, its history has been 
largely shaped by the region’s political history. How have art curators 
dealt with this predicament? What narrative strategies have they 
employed in presenting the artistic production of the former East to the 
rest of the world? And, how have these strategies re-shaped the art map 
of ‘united’ post-Cold War Europe?
The most immediate response of curators exhibiting modern and 
contemporary art from Central and Eastern Europe after the fall of the 
Berlin Wall was to try to accommodate it into the master narrative of 
Western art history, mostly by emphasising similarities and parallel 
artistic developments. One such exhibition was Europa, Europa (1994), 
curated by Ryszard Stanislawski and Christoph Brockhaus in Bonn. This 
exhibition, as art historian Piotr Piotrowski (2009, 19) points out, 
1 This essay draws on the findings of a research project (“Contemporary art as ars memoriae: 
Artistic and curatorial practices of facing the ghosts of the past in post-communist Europe”) that 
I carried out as a Körber Junior Visiting Fellow at the Institute for Human Sciences in Vienna 
from January to June 2007.
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“subjected the art of Eastern Europe to an inspection of the West, an 
inspection that used its own language and its own value system as the 
criteria of significance and excellence.” It is in view of this love-hate 
relationship of the East with the West that Eastern European cultures 
are often described as ‘self-colonising’, i.e. cultures which “import alien 
values and models of civilisation by themselves and […] lovingly 
colonize their own authenticity through these foreign models”.2 Such 
critical awareness of the ‘dangers’ of self-colonisation often guides the 
work of Eastern European curators, as many exhibition concepts reveal.
What one may call ‘post-colonialist’ curatorial narratives are 
narratives which critically examine the implications of the imagined 
‘colonisation’ of the East by the West in terms of both culture and 
economy. Such narratives are passionately engaged in questioning the 
positions of the centre and its peripheries, the mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion, construction of otherness, and the negotiation of 
geopolitical hierarchies and boundaries. Take, for example, the theme of 
the inaugural First Prague Biennial (2003) – Peripheries Become the Center 
– which clearly demonstrates the emancipatory standpoint taken by its 
curators. It is also in this context that exhibitions such as the Last East 
European Show (2003) at the Museum of Contemporary Art in Belgrade, or 
terms such as the ‘former West’, coined by Igor Zabel (and presently 
serving as the title of a long-term research and exhibition project, run 
by BAK, Utrecht), came into being.
In order to legitimise themselves, post-colonialist curatorial 
narratives resort to different claims. Most often these are art-historical 
claims challenging the postulates of Western art theory and re-
establishing Eastern European art’s status. The arguments abound: 
tracing the historical origins of avant-garde back to the East; questioning 
the exceptionality of Western modernism by introducing the notion of 
parallel modernisms in the East and in the West; highlighting concurrent 
developments of conceptual art in the East and the West; emphasising 
2 Kiossev 1999, 114.
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the similarities between American pop art and Soviet ‘sots art’; 
examining links and contacts of second avant-garde Eastern European 
artists with neo-avant-garde Western movements, such as Fluxus and 
Wiener Aktionismus; rehabilitating socialist realist art as a legitimate 
successor of the early avant-garde, etc. Dream Factory Communism (2003) 
at Schirn Kunsthalle, Frankfurt, curated by Boris Groys, was particularly 
influential in endorsing the idea of continuity between Russian historical 
avant-garde, socialist realism, and sots art.
Other post-colonialist curatorial narratives refer to the East’s 
‘underdevelopment’ as resulting from its totalitarian experience, viewed 
as an act of historical injustice bestowed upon it. Such apologetic claims 
may be spotted in the use of tropes such as ‘severed avant-gardes’, 
‘interrupted’ or ‘impossible histories’, etc. in the titles and concepts of 
many exhibitions. A revealing example is Living Art – On the Edge of 
Europe (2006) – an exhibition at the Kröller-Müller Museum in the 
Netherlands, which aimed to restore ‘justice’ to the previously 
marginalised Eastern European artists, no less deserving of recognition 
than their Western counterparts, by granting them access to and centre 
stage on the international art scene, and perhaps more importantly, 
market.
In fact, the cumbersome situation of Eastern European artists under 
the totalitarian regime is often highlighted by curators. Even if such 
‘heroic’ narratives are found in Western and Eastern contexts alike, they 
appear to be much more common in the United States, where many 
Soviet dissident artists emigrated in the 1980s, and where several 
substantial private collections of ‘non-conformist’ art from the former 
Soviet republics are housed. One of the largest collections of this kind, 
Norton and Nancy Dodge Collection at the Zimmerli Art Museum in New 
Brunswick, N.J., takes pride in embodying “the purest rationale for the 
creation of art: the struggle for freedom of self-expression in spite of – 
and in defiance of – a repressive government”.3 Heroic narratives thus 
attach an aura of martyrdom to Eastern artists, portraying them as 
3 Dodge/Rosenfeld 1995, 7.
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‘heroes’ in the struggle for freedom of self-expression – unquestionably 
a major factor in the development of modern art.
Another curatorial strategy for overcoming the pitfalls of the post-
colonialist rhetoric is to focus on local contexts instead. Such 
‘contextualising’ narratives insist on the incomparability between the 
artistic processes on both sides of the Iron Curtain and underline the 
diversity and specificity of Central and Eastern European art in terms of 
content and context of production (and let’s not forget, distribution), 
even if less so in terms of art form. Some exhibit the artistic practices in 
culturally and historically distinctive regions such as Central Europe, 
the Balkans, the Baltics, and the countries of the former Yugoslav 
Federation. The Balkans, for example, conceived as “the most radical 
and illustrative theme of Eastern European otherness”,4 appeared as the 
focus of three internationally acclaimed curatorial projects – Harold 
Szeemann’s Blood and Honey: Future’s in the Balkans, Rene Block’s In the 
Gorges of the Balkans: A Report, and Peter Weibel’s In Search of Balkania, all 
three of them taking place at about the same time in Austria and 
Germany in 2002 and 2003.
Contextualising narratives produce country-specific art-historical 
taxonomies and periodisations, taking into account local artistic 
traditions along with the political events which affected the individual 
countries and the differences in the repressive regimes and their politics 
in the field of culture. Curator and art historian Elona Lubyte, for 
instance, used the metaphor ‘quiet modernism’ to describe the nature 
of artistic processes in Soviet Lithuania in the 1960s-1980s. In the same 
vein, contextualising narratives attempt to break down clear-cut 
dichotomies by pointing out their relativity. Some curators discuss the 
ambiguity of the distinction between ‘official’ art and ‘unofficial’ art, 
and introduce in-between categories, such as semi-official art or semi-
non-conformist art. Furthermore, they allude to the compromises that 
both official and unofficial artists were compelled to make in their work 
and everyday life.
4 Peraica 2006, 473.
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The most productive strategy for situating contemporary Eastern 
European art on the art map of ‘New Europe’, however, has to do with 
the efforts made for its historicisation and institutionalisation. The 
sheer number of collections, archives, galleries, museums, art biennials, 
journals, and research institutes dealing with the late socialist and post-
socialist art of Central and Eastern Europe has noticeably increased in 
recent years. The most evident outcome is the establishment of what 
one may discern as an Eastern European contemporary art canon – a 
solid number of artists and works appearing repeatedly in larger 
exhibitions.
When talking about historicising Eastern European art, it is 
impossible not to mention East Art Map – an ongoing project, initiated by 
the Slovenian artists’ group Irwin in 2001, which paradoxically turned 
the task of ‘mapping’ the art of Europe’s former East into an art project 
itself. Given the lack of an art-historical referential system for artworks 
and artists in Eastern Europe, the aim of East Art Map, as its authors 
assert, is “to present art from the whole space of Eastern Europe, taking 
artists out of their national frameworks and presenting them in a 
unified scheme.”5 
Another noteworthy project is the Interrupted Histories exhibition 
(2006) at Moderna Galerija, Ljubljana, which challenged the West’s 
domination in establishing the internationally valid art-historical 
canon. The artists and groups invited to participate in the show acted as 
archivists, curators, historians, anthropologists, and ethnologists at the 
same time. The purpose of these self-historicising strategies, however, 
was “not to establish yet another collective narrative such as the 
Western world is familiar with.”6 As the curator of the show, Zdenka 
Badovinac (2006, 11), remarks, “these artists are not interested in 
creating a new big history, but are rather interested in the conditions 
that sustain the tension between small and temporary histories and 
5 Irwin 2006, 12.
6 Badonivac 2006, 11.
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what is defined as big history.” The very principle of constructing ‘grand 
narratives’ is at stake here.
The establishment of specialised collections of modern and 
contemporary artworks from Central and Eastern Europe has played a 
critical historicising and institutionalising role, since collections have a 
much more lasting impact on art history than single exhibitions. Kontakt. 
The Art Collection of Erste Bank Group, set up in 2004, is indisputably one of 
the most ambitious collecting endeavours in this realm. Interestingly, 
the rationale behind Kontakt’s collecting strategy combines post-
colonialist (“reformulating art history and thus questioning the Western 
European canon of art”7), contextualising (“to develop a collection with 
a sound art-historical and conceptual basis that deals with artistic 
positions rooted in a specific location and context”8), and Europeanising 
(“to present works that play a decisive role in the formation of a common 
and unified European art history”9) intentions. 
ArtEast 2000+ Collection, whose beginnings go back to the 1990s, 
pursues similar goals. The initiative, however, does not come from a 
financial group in the West, but from an art museum in the East – 
Moderna Galerija in Ljubljana. With the opening of the Museum of 
Contemporary Art Metelkova in Ljubljana in November 2011, the ArtEast 
2000+ collection found itself a permanent home – moreover, a certain 
chapter in the historicisation of modern and contemporary Eastern 
European art seems to have come to a close.
Unsurprisingly, the European integration process and the two waves 
of European Union enlargement in 2004 and 2007 gave rise to projects 
showcasing the art and culture of the new Member States. An 
unprecedented number of exhibitions on the so-called New Europe 
(usually initiated and supported by various European institutions) 
employed a specific curatorial narrative emphasising the role of art and 




culture in bridging the differences between the two parts of Europe, 
culturally and politically divided during the Cold War. Building bridges, 
crossing borders, and tearing down walls appeared as central metaphors 
in the curatorial statements of these ‘Europeanisation’ exhibitions. 
Whereas most of them underscored the diversity of artistic processes in 
Europe across space and time, they also insisted on the idea of Europe 
having a cultural and political identity of its own, as the title of the 
exhibition © EUROPE EXISTS (2003) in Thessaloniki most unequivocally 
asserted. The oftentimes irreconcilable claims of the curators about 
aesthetic heterogeneity and homogeneity, independence and 
interdependence, specificity and yet exemplarity, simply reiterated the 
formula ‘united in diversity’ and thus reproduced the major predicament 
of European cultural identity narratives as a whole.
One might take the exhibition Passage Europe: A Certain Look at Central 
and East European Art (2004) at the Museum of Modern Art in Saint-
Étienne as an example. Its curator, Lorand Hegyi, situated the exhibition 
in the context of the new chances, hopes, and expectations for rebuilding 
the broken historical ties between the various European cultural centres, 
opened up by the EU enlargement. The exhibition highlighted the role of 
artists in the process of re-opening and re-establishing of the ‘connecting 
passages’ of Europe – metaphorical meeting places where artists, 
writers, philosophers, architects, film and theatre experts, and musicians 
exchange intellectual ideas and cultural messages. In fact, many 
‘Europeanisation’ exhibitions seem to be placing great hopes in the 
potential for transcendence and transformation that creative work and 
contemporary art practices hold. Whereas contemporary art’s 
unmatched power of subversion and deconstruction comes in very 
handy when it comes to addressing the controversial nature of post-
Wall Europe’s identities, it is still doubtful whether it has the potential 
for constructing new ones.
In the end, curatorial aspirations for a critical, comparative and 
transnational examination of local artistic processes in the former 
Eastern Bloc, along with their stylistic variations and mutations, viewed 
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in the context of diverging historical processes, political circumstances, 
and external influences, may well undermine any narrative structure. 
The bottom-line, however, is simple: it is complicated.
Svetla Kazalarska has a Ph.D. (2011) in Cultural Anthropology from the ‘St. 
Kliment Ohridski’ University of Sofia. Her dissertation explores the difficult 
relationships between history and memory at the newly established museums of 
communism in Central and Eastern Europe after 1989. Her research interests are 
spread across several fields: post-communist memory and historiography, urban 
anthropology of the post-communist cities, visual studies, and contemporary art 
histories.
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the Status Quo 
Wietske Maas 
Art’s capacity to understand, with 
empathy, other cultures and ways of 
thinking can allow us to contemplate 
a future that would otherwise be 
unimaginable.
Scenarios about Europe: Beyond the Status Quo Wietske Maas
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Scenarios about Europe: Beyond the Status Quo
Scenarios about Europe is a European collaborative project involving 
artists, curators, and organisations – a look at how artistic narratives 
can stimulate a revitalised thinking about Europe. It resulted in a series 
of three exhibitions shown in Leipzig’s Museum of Contemporary Art 
(Galerie für Zeitgenossische Kunst – GfZK) from September 2011 through 
to March 2012. The project’s conceptual approach understands Europe 
as a geographic space of cultural profusion and contradiction. Scenarios 
about Europe is not a defence of Europe as a unified, conclusive identity, 
but rather a dislodging – affected by art’s energisingly different gaze and 
sensibility – of such anchored conceptions. 
Under the direction of Barbara Steiner, a group of ten international 
curators were entrusted with the task of curating one artistic scenario 
per exhibition, each time working with different artists. The series of 30 
scenarios (three scenarios per curator) involved collaboration between 
different artistic practices, communities and publics, generations, and 
cultural contexts. The scenarios do not neatly fit together, but are more 
like a medley of fabrics, a quilt that shows both the provincial patches 
and metropolitan seams of this multiple thing called Europe. Between 
them, the scenarios form new relationships between particular 
narratives and urgently needed alternatives to clichéd conceptions of 
European identity.
For each exhibition, the curators were allocated one zone in the 
museum’s new building, GfZK-2. It was left up to them to decide 
whether to feature a project by one or several artists. At the time of 
writing, the 30 scenarios were the first cursory plots; a study for a bigger 
project entitled Europe (to the power of) n will be transferred in 2012-2013 
to the contexts of the project’s partner cities within and outside the 
European Union – for instance, Brussels, Istanbul, London, Łódź, Minsk, 
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Novi Sad, Høvikodden/Oslo, Donostia, San Sebastián, and Beijing. These 
cities were chosen mainly for their ‘dislocation’ from the official 
narrative of EU-Europe. What exactly will happen in the translation 
between the scenarios and their realisations in the lively, gritty realities 
of each city remains to be seen. This moment of translation from the 
blueprint exhibition trilogy in Leipzig to dispersed European and extra-
European metropolises will, in a best-case scenario, generate fertile 
resonances between intention and reality, between a particular view of 
Europe and the capacity of art to probe a different scenario, one that 
does not shy away from the dilemmas and complexities of Europe as a 
figure of thought. 
The sheer immensity of the scenarios will not allow a write-up that 
includes all 30. Instead, I have chosen to zoom in on three curatorial 
narratives of three curators spanning the three exhibitions. The first is 
Belgian curator Filip Luyckx, who selected artists that draw an image of 
a future European society in which biological and cultural hybridity is 
taken for granted. The second is Spanish-Basque curator Peio Aguirre, 
who invited artists whose work is sensitive to a regional or local 
environment in response to the homogenising forces of an overarching 
national identity or free-market ideology. The third is Belarusian curator 
Lena Prents, who invited artists from her home country to explore the 
debates and realities of Belarusian/European identities in a country 
whose most influential curator is the state.1
A Cosmopolitan Gene Pool
Europe is essentially made up of its inhabitants, people who live 
across a geographical expanse, from inside the rim of the Arctic Circle to 
the Mediterranean coastlines. As Filip Luyckx remarked, “The future of 
the continent lies in the talents and weaknesses of all individuals and 
1 Prents, L. 2012, ‘Representation and Context’, in: B. Steiner (ed.), The Scenario-Book, Berlin, 
182.
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communities together”2 – and also in the way they are able to cooperate 
with one another across natural and cultural archipelagos. Luyckx sees 
that this is precisely where the creative possibility in forming a European 
identity lies: not by becoming like one another, but by looking at the 
continual movement of people and the interchange of cultures as the a 
priori condition of the continent. Only if we step back from the 
microcosms of our own cultures and timescales can we see that the 
story of Europe is one of cosmopolitan flux between genes and cultures 
over the course of millennia.
This cosmopolitan ideal is incarnated in Belgian artist Koen 
Vanmechelen’s  scenario, which is based on his long-term Cosmopolitan 
Chicken Project (CC®P 1999-2010),3 which explores questions of genetic 
and cultural diversity using the chicken and the egg as artistic tools. In 
collaboration with a leading geneticist, Vanmechelen has been 
crossbreeding ‘purebred’ chickens from around the world. The project 
highlights how humans, in domesticating animals over thousands of 
years, have developed a strong bio-cultural relation with their pets and 
livestock. The animal is a cultural product. Although purebred poultry 
such as the Red Jersey Giant and the Poulet de Bresse are renowned for 
their gustatory qualities, they are also mascots of national identity. To 
sabotage these fabricated genetic borders, Vanmechelen started 
crossbreeding the Flemish Mechelse koekoek with the French Poulet de 
bresse to create the Mechelse bresse. The Melchelse bresse was later 
cross-bred with the English redcap to create the Mechelse redcap, and 
so on. 
These hybrid ‘super bastard’ chickens undermine concepts of 
cultural and racial purity, acknowledging instead the biological strength 
of genetic diversity. Moreover, Vanmechelen’s new lineage of mongrelised 
2 Luycks, F. 2012, ‘The Critical Fundamentals of Europe’, in: B. Steiner (ed.), The Scenario-Book, 
Berlin, 170.
3 CC®P – abbreviation of the project’s name: Cosmopolitan Chicken Project. Needless to say, 
the ‘®’ stands for registered trademark.
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chickens creates an archetype chicken which is an apt analogy of the 
complexity inherent in our global condition: each of our own lives forms 
part of a much longer story that has been shaped by thousands of years 
of bio-cultural mixing, a story when told back far enough transgresses 
cultural and ethnic binaries. The CC®P project thus becomes a simile 
for Europe, which cannot put any exclusive claim on any singular 
cultural or genetic heritage. Europe itself never was and never will be a 
sealed-off ethnic unity, but rather a deeply entrenched story of mass 
migration. We are all entangled within a history of genetic exchange 
that exceeds the boundaries of any region, nation or even continent.
Inside the gallery space are fourteen chicken portraits assembled 
like a royal family tree. These are the portraits of the CC®P bastard 
chickens that stem from the Mechelse koekoek and the Poulet de bresse. 
On looking at the portraits we see that the artist has kept the Mechelse 
strain in each generation of cross-breeding. It is no coincidence that he 
chose the Mechelse chicken. The artist’s name has an affinity with the 
Mechelse koekoek that sardonically mocks the certificate of authenticity 
of being Mechelse, of coming from Mechelen, Belgium. A more critical 
reading, however, is that the experiment ends up reinforcing the artist’s 
own identity as a Flemish man who compares himself with every other 
nationality and ethnicity, one that redefines and re-centres the 
Eurocentric subject. 
Another chicken-and-egg quandary raised by CC®P is that the 
experiment not only connotes but also follows the same logic as genetic 
breeding programmes. The different sub-species of chickens which 
Vanmechelen cultivates would not necessarily reproduce of their own 
choosing. The ‘genetic freedom’ in this regard is scripted by the human, 
not the animal. The artist has transformed the chicken into an 
allegorical chicken, manufacturing life according to a predetermined 
albeit aesthetic rationale. Vanmechelen even registers the project with 
a trademark – CC®P – which stamps the chicken as an owned, 
potentially commercial product licensed to a genetic and artistic 
research venture, rather than as a free form of life. Arguably, the artist 
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could have been using this trademark symbol ironically; nevertheless, 
this use of the bio-industry’s genetic manufacture, modification, and 
ownership is too ambiguous to stand as a critical repudiation of the 
industry. But Vanmechelen is himself aware of the unpredictability of 
genetic behaviour and the attempt to pursue a breeding programme of 
any sort: “Manipulation never is without risks. The egg hides a 
mysterious entity, whose essence is still hidden for us. Possibly positive, 
but maybe destructive. Genes never listen. Its freedom can mean 
rapture or capture.”4 
Life itself is nothing but migration, and our genes have the capacity 
to transcend any border, whether political, economic, cultural or social. 
As a European narrative, the genetic freedom scenario speaks about the 
borderless circulation of genetic exchange that defines all of our lives – 
nature is larger and ultimately more formidable than our cultural 
constructs. Genetic freedom compels us to see that borders of nations and 
cultures are but fictions created in our own heads. The bottom line is 
that we, like the chickens staring before us, are all hybrids in a larger 
evolutionary story. Alongside this evolutionary story, we need ambivalent 
rather than determining voices of culture to enable us to fathom 
hybridity as a natural part of life.
Keeping the Patchwork of Diverse Urban Fabrics
Europe as a mosaic of peoples and communities in conflict is the 
motif of Peio Aguirre’s curatorial plot. Each artist chosen by Aguirre 
examines how local environments or expressions of atypical local 
identity challenge an archetypical image of selfhood and belonging 
perpetrated by nationalist sentiment or by the homogenising force of 
economic power.
For Scenario 2, Annika Eriksson was invited to produce Wir bleiben 
(2011), a film-installation about a house on the verge of gentrification in 
4 Koen Vanmechelen, quoted in the accompanying wall text.
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Mitte, a central district of former East Berlin. This building, in which the 
artist herself had lived for ten years, is now largely vacated. When the 
residents found out that they were to be evicted by the company that 
bought the building, Eriksson decided to return to her former home to 
make a homage to the house and her ex-neighbours’ silent fight to stay 
put. 
Wir bleiben (‘We’re staying’) interlaces the narratives of the four 
remaining residents through a video installation which provides an 
intimate window onto the domestic environments of the tenants’ 
apartments. An empty hallway; an unadorned room; the close-up detail 
of chipped paint on the doorframe; the characteristic floorboards (Dielen) 
of a Berliner Altbau. The static frames of the house’s interior give a sense 
of having walked over an invisible threshold into a layered space where 
the material details – windows, corridors, rooms – and immaterial 
memories of the residents are differentiated and multiplied.  
Together, the stories of the remaining tenants form a soundtrack, a 
defiant murmur against the widespread erasure of the public housing 
sector and any political debate around the right to social housing. Wir 
bleiben shows us how our lives are continuously moulded by the 
structures in which we live – by the physical shape of the homes in 
which we dwell, but, moreover, by the global economic culture which 
ultimately determines how and where we live. The Mitte building thus 
becomes a monument to the struggle that is taking place inside and 
against a cityscape which is incrementally denying the right of 
individuals of different class backgrounds to be participant citizens. 
Ultimately, this scenario raises the question: What will happen to 
the life of city centres if people from different scales of the social 
spectrum cannot participate in them? Will the new frontiers of profit 
reduce the commingling of city lives till we end up with (and in) a 
uniform zone of corporate speculation? Although Eriksson’s portrait of 
the house and its inhabitants is a localised story, it also alludes to the 
much larger story of how Europe has valued the European market over 
and above its people. 
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Wir bleiben is an artistic narrative that causes us to pause and 
consider the myriad identities that contribute to the larger culture of 
the city. It gives the tenants a symbolic value, not through any explicit 
form of activism, but by making their passive occupation and the 
personal testimonies that constitute the city, any European city, visible.
Europe Inside Out
Europe is a continent of changing contours. Its geographic territory 
is the subject of constant dispute. Recently a claim was made that the 
waters of a small lake bearing the name of Sho in north-east Belarus is 
the geographic mid-point of Europe. This ostensible ‘centre’ does not, 
however, accord with Belarus’s fraught relations with Europe, which 
involve permanent political negotiations. For Scenarios about Europe, 
curator Lena Prents invited three artists from Belarus who deal with 
narratives of a country that is geographically inside yet democratically 
outside Europe. Marina Naprushkina (Scenario 1), Aleksander Komarov 
(Scenario 2), and Jura Shust (Scenario 3) depict the equivocal relationships 
between language and identity, democracy and dictatorship, and Belarus 
and Europe. In their own ways, the artists explore an outside view of 
Belarus and of Europe, one that is not defined by the autocratic state. 
Naprushkina’s Wealth for All opens up a disturbing view on the 
contradiction between empty rhetoric, exemplified by the utterances of 
her home country’s authoritarian regime, and the reality of everyday 
life. Unfulfilled political promises to improve Belarusian society are 
reproduced by the artist in the form of large printed advertising images 
on tarpaulin sheets that are normally used to cover the facades of 
buildings in Minsk. These giant images show the finished results of 
impressive projects such as the national library, shopping malls, and 
memorials. Yet under these pixellated plastic veneers the unfinished 
buildings remain in a state of suspended construction, frozen between 
the wiles of a beautiful dream and the reality of an empty ideological 
exertion. Accompanying the tarpaulin facades are video portraits of 
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several Minsk residents who recite verbatim the speeches of German 
politicians (Angela Merkel, Guido Westerwelle, Oskar Lafontaine) 
translated into Belarusian. The phrases of linguistic sophistry – such as 
the title ‘Wealth for All’, which was Gregor Gysi’s electoral slogan – are 
political mantras divorced from the everyday, fervently undemocratic 
and unattainable reality experienced by Belarusian citizens. 
In his film Language Lessons, Komarov asked Belarusian intellectuals 
to reflect on the complex history of the native Belarusian language, 
including its status and use as a form of resistance since the early years 
of Perestroika. His film recounts the fable of the foundation of Minsk, 
according to which the city was named after a miller who ground 
granite which was then baked into bread and distributed among the 
people. This fable becomes a metaphor for the whole of Belarusian 
history and culture in which solid culture (that which is familiar) is 
perpetually ground and milled. Komarov’s film is punctuated by 
fragments of a heroic Soviet stone sculpture, but instead of capturing 
the total sculpture as a super-human tableau, the artist concentrates on 
the everyday people it depicts, removing them from their stylisation and 
presenting them in relation to the protagonists of his film. The shards of 
stone sculpture and the distributed stone flour in the legend correspond 
with Belarus’s real-life scenario of a shared language understood by 
everyone having been subject to intensive political transformation and 
thus never becoming fully formed.
Shust’s Euro Windows also deals with the fragmented translation of 
ideals into actualities. The poster-sized graphics are stark black-and-
white drawings that depict issues around the ‘Europeanisation of 
Belarus’. The artist’s ‘windows’ view Europe as an ambiguous 
construction which oscillates between democratic human ideals and 
commercial branding. For example, Belarus’s national symbol of a flying 
white stork weather vane is illustrated within a glass bell, thereby 
becoming an image of both freedom and confinement. The label ‘Europe’ 
is a hallmark of consumer products, associated with free choice; 
however, equating consumerism with freedom leads to a contradiction 
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in terms, given that Europe’s continued trade with Belarus finances 
President Lukashenko’s repressive state apparatus. Moreover, 
consumerism for its own sake is itself a questionable objective, since 
unrestricted economisation in all social areas has spawned Europe’s 
own crisis of economic and social solidarity. 
Conclusion
All in all, Scenarios about Europe is a diligent search for artistic 
interpolations that confront us with difficult questions about Europe’s 
immense diversity. The most telling scenarios offer an engaging 
hypothesis regarding the complex and contradictory realities of Europe, 
provoking a sense of Europe beyond the anaesthetising effects of 
‘financialisation’, nationalism, and out-of-touch political programmes. 
Yet it is clear that the presentation and realisation of an individual 
scenario is not enough; rather, the value is accumulative, making 
worthwhile the time spent constructing this vast multifarious stage for 
postulated storytelling. It is a stage for exploration – of thinking about 
Europe in terms of potential values and community, and how these 
could be extended beyond the purposes of a singular ideological story. 
A narrative that reflects the lived realities of its participants requires 
a genuine process of active engagement and reinvention by and between 
different voices. Scenarios about Europe, and subsequently Europe (to the 
power of n), has taken an intrepid step by summoning artists, curators, 
and respective partners to spend years together building this common 
yet changing stage through which the participants can enact stories, 
thoughts, and actions without demarcating a monolithic direction. Art’s 
capacity to understand, with empathy, other cultures and ways of 
thinking can allow us to contemplate a future that would otherwise be 
unimaginable. Yet it is also the very process of making such an 
exhibition and the wider context of interactions between people, places, 
and pasts occurring ‘behind the scenes’ which build the necessary 
structure for artists and creative thinkers to contribute to a shared 
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narrative for Europe. 
This modus operandi creates a dynamic collaborative space in which 
we can encounter one another’s sensibilities, values, doubts, and quests 
– a common affectivity, which is precisely what is missing in the growing 
gap between Europe and its ‘people’. Scenarios about Europe presents a 
complex challenge to the established perceptions of Europe’s history, 
offering entry points into a changing European space which plays a 
modest rather than a dominant part in a globalised world. In setting the 
scene for such artistic scenario-thinking, the project reminds us that it 
is the prospect of a longer-term collective process that, over time, 
stitches together new sensibilities for perceiving, thinking and enacting 
Europe differently.
Wietske Maas is an independent artist researching urban food ecologies. She 
works for the  European Cultural Foundation as creative producer of its 
annual Princess Margriet Award.
152
Spengler Complex  
Europe
Thijs van Nimwegen and 
Tomas Kucerovsky
Osvald takes a walk in the suburbs 
of a European city and thinks about 
urban decay and the end of civilisation.
Spengler Complex (Europe) Thijs van Nimwegen and Tomas Kucerovsky
sometimes, on gray, rainy days, i take a walk in the suburbs.
story: Thijs Van Nimwegen Art: Tomas Kucerovsky
I prefer the ones that are somewhat slummy, 
that have a feel of poverty and social disarray.
And then I start to imagine.
I imagine this is not a slum, I imagine 
the whole world is like this.
A world after the apocalypse, be it 
nuclear, social or economic - it doesn’t 
matter. The world as a scrap yard, with 
the few people left barely surviving.
I think this fantasy has something 
to do with being European.
When you look at the science fiction
literature and movies of the 19th and 20th 
century, there’s a clear division between 
European and non-European works.
Stories from the USA, Australia and 
other postcolonial societies mostly
depict an optimistic, explorational
future, where humans have beaten nature 
and their own inadequacies, happily
conquering the universe.
If they show us a post-apocalyptical 
world, it’s one where the protagonist 
is a rebuilder: the first new airplane, 
restoring the postal service,
rediscovering old knowledge.
While in European literature and film, 
sci-fi stories tend to look back
at what once was.
They show us the final throes
of civilization; the destruction of
the last library, people failing to grow 
crops, a man standing on the edge
of the continent, overlooking an empty 
sea, as everyone else has died of
an unnamed plague.
It’s Huxley versus Orwell, Roddenberry 
versus Shelley. Oswald Spengler may 
have summed up this European fixation
on death instead of rebirth the best.
As for me, I definitely get
a masochistic thrill out
of this little fantasy.
I will leave the explanation
of this Spengler-complex







Through the Looking Glass
160
The Dwarfing of 
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of a new ‘abroad’.
The Dwarfing of Europe Revisited Paul Scheffer
162
The Dwarfing of Europe Revisited 
Everything has become so unpredictable that nobody seems to 
remember what the world looked like a short time ago. For many years 
the euro was celebrated as the crowning glory of integration, but over 
the last few years ‘rescuing’ that single currency has been the only 
concern. And nowadays nobody is surprised when European countries 
appeal to ‘developing countries’ such as China and Brazil to contribute 
to an emergency fund that is meant to haul us through the monetary 
winter. 
Or take the top-level talks of seven wealthy, industrialised countries, 
the so-called G7. From the mid-1970s this was the forum where the 
global economy’s principal problems were discussed. Until a few years 
ago it was inconceivable that China would join those talks as an equal 
participant. And now, in the midst of the euro-crisis, nobody can imagine 
holding a meeting without that country. The G7 seems to have been 
dissolved and the G20 is suddenly the forum where the world’s financial 
troubles are discussed. 
It is not just in Europe that the credit crisis has laid bare a shift in 
power relations; the much larger American mountain of debt has 
altered the landscape, too. For behind the ‘credit orgy’ on the far side of 
the Atlantic Ocean lurks China, which facilitated this accrual of debt by 
garnering huge dollar reserves. This has resulted in an interdependence 
between the two countries that was well-nigh unimaginable a decade 
ago.
I
In The White Tiger, the Indian novelist Aravind Adiga describes the 
rise of an entrepreneur in Bangalore. The novel takes the form of an 
open letter to the Chinese premier, Wen Jiabao. The businessman has 
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heard that the politician will be visiting his city in order to acquaint 
himself with the keys to success of Indian entrepreneurship, especially 
in the field of information technology. 
Somewhere in the margins of his narrative we read: “White men will 
be finished within my lifetime. There are blacks and reds too, but I have 
no idea what they’re up to – the radio never talks about them. My 
humble prediction: in twenty years’ time, it will be just us yellow men 
and brown men at the top of the pyramid, and we’ll rule the whole 
world. And God save everyone else.” 
This is a witty summary of whole shelves of books to be found in 
many a scholarly library, books which predict that the world economy’s 
centre of gravity is shifting slowly but surely to the East, in the same 
way it once shifted to the West. When European countries look to 
Chinese support to solve their debt crisis, then we are seeing what is 
afoot in a nutshell.
The credit crisis accelerates a development that has been ongoing 
for much longer, namely the beginning of the end of Western hegemony, 
more particularly that of America. Over the coming decades, three of 
the world’s four largest economies will be non-Western: Japan, India, 
and China. The growth of the last two countries is astonishing: in China 
growth has averaged nine per cent per annum over the last 30 years, i.e. 
doubling in size every eight years. The average income there is seven 
times as high as in 1979 and 400 million people have been freed from 
poverty. Forecasts indicate that China’s GDP will be higher than that of 
the USA by about 2025. Another figure serves to illustrate this: estimates 
suggest that in 2020 the Chinese share in world trade will already have 
reached 12.1% in 2020, while the USA’s will be 8.8% and the European 
Union’s 8.3%. 
Demographic balances are in the process of shifting as well. In 1913 
Europe still accounted for 14.6% of the world population, but by 2001 
that was just 6.4%, and about 40% of that world population lives in 
China and India. The Singaporean diplomat and academic Kishore 
Mahbubani has highlighted this idea: “It is futile for the 12 percent of 
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the world’s population who live in the West to imagine they can 
determine the destinies of the remaining 88 percent, many of whom feel 
newly energized and empowered.”
The contribution of a large part of the world population to the global 
economy has, of course, been exceptionally small over the last hundred 
years. In 1960, the combined share of China, India, Indonesia, and Brazil 
in the world economy was no more than 29% of the weight of these 
countries in terms of population. That has already risen to 65% and the 
forecast for 2030 is 95%, so the share of these countries in the world 
economy will by that time reflect their share in the world population. 
In addition, the demographic make-up of the Western world is 
changing rapidly. The USA will increasingly be populated by migrants 
from outside Europe. It is forecast that by the middle of the 21st century 
a quarter of the USA’s population will be Hispanic, and that is without 
mentioning the many other population groups. This also applies for 
Europe, where the level of immigration is comparable. In countries such 
as Germany, France, and the Netherlands, by circa 2050 about a third of 
the population will be immigrants, or their direct descendants. Also in 
that regard, a traditional world is being lost. 
The history of globalisation does not follow a rectilinear path, but 
displays constant shifts in the balance of power. The French historian 
Fernand Braudel ascertained long ago that the centre of the world 
economy shifts time and again: “In the years 1590-1610 or thereabouts, 
the centre shifted to Amsterdam, which remained the midpoint of the 
European zone for almost two centuries. Between 1780 and 1815 it 
shifted to London, and in 1929 it crossed the Atlantic Ocean and 
established itself in New York.” 
From this perspective, the waning of the European powers had of 
course been ongoing for a long time. The big question for the coming 
decades is how the Western world, and Europe in particular, will manage 
to deal with this change, which is part and parcel of globalisation. A 
shift towards Beijing and Shanghai first and foremost is to be expected, 
though the economic weight of Mumbai, São Paulo, and Moscow will 
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also increase proportionately. And the birth of new global powers is rare: 
the current list with countries such as the USA, Russia, Germany, France, 
and the UK has remained stable for almost 200 years. 
There are certainly questions to be asked about the sustainability of 
Chinese growth. Sooner or later the country will have to abandon its 
artificial undervaluation of its own currency. The country will also be 
confronted with highly treacherous political reforms and after 2025 will 
be faced with the consequences of a rapidly ageing population. In 
addition, it is already contending with the devastating environmental 
damage of decades of untrammelled growth. Lastly, the country will feel 
the consequences of slower growth or even recession in Europe and 
America, with all the attendant risks of social unrest. The trend is, 
however, obvious: the relative balances of power will shift eastward. 
II
This development means the Western world will be confronted with 
scores of new questions, but the most important change is that the 
perception of Europe in countries such as China, India, and Brazil will 
acquire ever greater significance. Having lived for almost two centuries 
with a European and later American predominance, developments are 
now moving towards a world that is polycentric at least, a world in 
which Europe will increasingly be confronted with economic and 
cultural innovation from the East and South. 
It is obvious that the USA’s and Europe’s relative loss of power will 
have consequences for how the West is perceived by the rest of the 
world. And in the same way the ‘orientalism’ of European countries was 
once imperative for other parts of the world, the evolution of the public 
perception of Europe in countries like China and Brazil will prove to be 
increasingly relevant for European societies. Thus there is every reason 
to study that image-building in greater depth, throughout its historical 
development but with an emphasis on the era after ‘1989’, which can be 
pinpointed as the dawn of a new era – certainly from a European 
perspective. 
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The British historian Arnold Toynbee saw this development looming 
long ago. “The paradox of our generation is that all the world has now 
profited by an education which the West has provided, except the West 
herself,” he wrote in his 1948 essay ‘The Dwarfing of Europe’. “The West 
to-day is still looking at history from the old parochial self-centred 
standpoint which the other living societies have by now been compelled 
to transcend.” But that complacent attitude could not endure, for 
“sooner or later, the West, in her turn, is bound to receive the re-
education which the other civilizations have obtained already.” In the 
ascendancy of the so-called BRIC countries we can see Toynbee’s 
prediction being borne out. Europe touched the world and on the 
rebound the world is now touching Europe. 
We are seeing an unparalleled post-colonial role reversal, or rather 
we are witnessing the end of the post-colonial world. Last year the 
Angolan president, José Eduardo dos Santos, received the Portuguese 
prime minister in Luanda. During the state visit, dos Santos uttered 
these amiable (or rather patronising) words: “We are aware of the 
difficulties the Portuguese people have faced recently, and Angola is 
open and available to help Portugal face this crisis. At this difficult time 
when the financial crisis is affecting Portugal, it is important for us to 
remember the historical ties between our countries.”
Slowly but very surely the roles are being reversed. While for a long 
time the South migrated to the North, we are now seeing the first 
movements in the opposite direction. The long queues in front of the 
Angolan consulate in Lisbon tell the story. The diminishing opportunities 
in their own country are propelling more and more Portuguese people in 
the direction of former colonies like Angola and Brazil.
“Here you at least have the sense that things are moving, people are 
positive and full of confidence,” as one of these young migrants phrased 
it. “I will never return to the depressiveness of Portugal.” The departure 
of these youngsters speaks volumes about expectations for the future. 
The elite of Angola, a country which only gained its independence in 
1975 and until recently was strife-torn and poverty-stricken, is now 
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buying up Portuguese businesses. Even Portugal’s national airline could 
change hands at some point. 
“This is a post-colonial role reversal that is unprecedented in world 
history. Not only Portugal, but also other European countries will 
increasingly orient themselves towards countries that we still called the 
Third World until recently,” says Paulo Gorjão, the Director of the 
Portuguese Institute of International Relations and Security. The exodus 
of Portuguese people to the former colonies is a fine illustration of a tide 
that has turned. The moment has come for more students or 
entrepreneurs from European countries to leave for Shanghai, Mumbai, 
São Paulo or Singapore. The half million Portuguese people in Brazil 
have preceded them, and their emigration marks the beginning of the 
end of the post-colonial world.
To compensate for the growing uncertainty this entails, there are 
sufficient advantages: “For five hundred years the West has been the 
only civilization carrying the burden of advancing human knowledge 
and wealth,” as Kishore Mahbubani rightly notes. “Today, it can share 
this responsibility.” And sure enough a time will come when Nobel prizes 
will no longer primarily be won at American universities. The British 
Asia expert Martin Jacques goes a step further: “The emergence of 
Chinese modernity immediately de-centres and relativizes the position 
of the West. In fact, the challenge posed by the rise of China is far more 
likely to be cultural in nature.” And what applies for China in particular 
is also relevant to the world’s other emerging economies. The time has 
dawned when views about modernity are no longer determined by 
Western conceptions alone; a ‘contested modernity’ will prevail. 
That is not the whole story, of course, as the development is not 
quite so unequivocal. Will English gradually be supplanted by Chinese 
as the world language? Will films, music, science, and literature from 
Asia sweep the world? For the time being it does not seem that 
ethnocentric China will surpass the melting-pot of the USA in terms of 
culture. But even if this process moves more slowly, then it is still 
undeniable that the relative balances in the global economy are 
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primarily shifting eastward.
By no means is it about the economy alone; perhaps it is ultimately 
more about culture. The question raised by the Indian historian 
Ramachandra Guha has implications that extend beyond India: “One 
would think that given its size, diversity and institutional history, the 
Republic of India would provide a reservoir of political experience with 
which to refine or rethink theories being articulated in the West.” This is 
the hope associated with the great ongoing shift: the thinking in Europe 
and the USA must become increasingly aware of the experiences in 
other parts of the world, which are shaking themselves free of historical 
dependencies. 
III
The loss of power provokes useful self-reflection in another way. We 
have experienced it before: the shock of decolonisation had a beneficial 
effect in the post-war decades. Without that experience, Europe’s 
unification would have been inconceivable. The decisive initiative for 
conciliation was, after all, undertaken by former colonial powers like 
France and the Netherlands, which saw a means to check their decline 
in the integration of the ‘old’ continent. They first had to be thrown 
upon their own resources before they could regard one another as 
neighbours, which also explains the United Kingdom’s reticence about 
identifying with the European Community. The illusion of imperial 
greatness was long cherished, even though there was less and less 
reason for this after India gained her independence in 1947. 
Thus Asia’s rise also provided a major incentive for the creation of 
the internal market and the introduction of the euro in the early 1990s. 
Many people realise that Europe can only retain its standing in a global 
rivalry if it manages to reform itself. Economic and monetary unification 
– with all the serious problems we have encountered in recent years – is 
nevertheless an important precondition for Europe to make its own 
voice heard, to be able to continue pursuing its own societal model. 
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That relative loss of power should become an important element in 
how we talk about Europe. The story about unification is still primarily 
founded on what is sometimes termed the European civil war of 1914-
1945: the self-destruction of the old continent in two world wars. But it 
remains to be seen whether that reference to the past still possesses the 
same power of expression in a world where Europe is in relative terms 
actually shrinking.  
Politicians are accused of being concerned about nothing but the 
short term, but European unification demonstrates the capacity to learn 
from the violent past. The French man Jean Monnet, who was the 
founding father of European integration, spoke in his memoirs about 
“the fear that another war would approach if we did nothing in the 
foreseeable future,” and he wondered what could be done to bind France 
and Germany, creating a shared interest between the two nations before 
it was too late.
That reference to the war has motivated many to seek a closer 
rapprochement. They are images that make a lasting impression: a 
remorseful Willy Brandt on his knees in the Warsaw ghetto, Helmut 
Kohl and François Mitterrand standing hand in hand on the battlefield 
of Verdun, and more recently Vladimir Putin and the Polish premier 
Donald Tusk at the mass grave in Katyn. These conciliatory gestures 
highlight the guilt and shame about the wars that Europe brought upon 
herself and the world. And contrary to what many people thought, these 
emotions have not faded with the passing of time.
When the topic is Europe the war is never far away, to this very day. 
For example, the recent euro-crisis has prompted cautionary, or rather 
dramatic, statements to be uttered by Poland, France and, of course, 
Germany over the past year: the failure of the euro means that the 
chances of war in Europe will increase significantly. The French Minister 
of Foreign Affairs expressed this in muffled tones, but Poland’s Finance 
Minister, Jacek Rostowski, was rather more explicit: “There is a danger of 
an historic economic disaster – like the Great Depression in the 1930s – 
that would lead to war in Europe.” 
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A politician like Helmut Kohl acted on that conviction: unless he 
anchored his country in a monetary union the ghosts from the past 
would return. You could interpret such drum-beating as well-intended 
blackmail, but that pairing of currency and peace is currently being 
propagated anew, and that is the ‘gut feeling’ of Europe. It is difficult to 
argue against that ‘never again’, but it is not merely the memory of the 
war which ought to stand on its own two feet; the spectre of a potential 
recurrence of violent conflict diverts attention as well.  
People understand the experience of a generation as well as this 
experience’s productive significance for the project of European 
unification. ‘Never again!’ is, however, a form of Eurocentrism that is 
gradually becoming passé. It unintentionally but insistently turns the 
gaze inward, when an essential motive for integration lies outside the 
continent. 
A new narrative about ‘Europe’ should no longer take Berlin as its 
point of departure, but Beijing; must no longer begin in Paris but in São 
Paulo. In other words, we can only perceive Europe as ‘home’ if we form 
an image of a new ‘abroad’. When talking about Europe’s raison d’être, 
then that resides first and foremost in a world on which continental 
powers such as China, the USA, India, and Brazil will stamp their mark. 
‘Europe’ is the only scale on which to mould a distinctive societal model 
in the global economy. If that is correct then European integration is not 
about the loss of sovereignty, but about greater influence attained by 
acting together. 
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Confluence and Crossroads: 
Europe and the Fate of the Earth 
I
Bengal, where I am from, is a vast delta where thousands of creeks 
and rivers flow into each other to form a landscape that is mapped upon 
a grid of interlocking waterways.1 Here a confluence of rivers is both a 
seam and a separation – it joins many shores even as it holds them 
apart. The Bengali word for confluence is mohana which reflects this 
ambiguity while also adding to it an element of beguilement that evokes, 
in my mind, the image of the ‘crossroads’ – a metaphor that is almost 
universally identified with riddles and paradoxes, confusion, and crisis. 
But a crossroads is not just a link between points in space. It is also a 
junction in the axis of time, in the sense that it lies between the 
beginning of a journey and its end. This is one of the reasons why I want 
to use the twin images of the ‘confluence’ and the ‘crossroads’ to frame 
two issues that are of critical importance today, to Europe as well as the 
rest of the world. 
II
The first of these issues is migration. In recent years, as you well 
know, migration has come to be associated, in the minds of many 
Europeans, with a failure of cultural assimilation. But to put this in 
perspective let us consider the example of the hundreds of thousands 
– possibly millions – of Europeans who are now working on other 
continents: for example, in Dubai, Japan, Singapore, Brazil, Mozambique, 
South Africa, China, India, Thailand and so on. Let us ask: to what 
1 Ghosh’s essay is a shortened version of a speech delivered during the event Imagining Europe 
(4-7 October 2012), which was organised by ECF.
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degree do these Europeans integrate into their host societies? The reality 
is that many, if not most of them, make every effort to maintain a strict 
distance between themselves and the countries they live in. They have 
their own clubs, they send their children to their own schools, they live 
in their own neighbourhoods; and very few become conversant with the 
languages and cultures of the places they inhabit. 
If we look at the issue from this point of view – that is to say, if we 
start, not by looking at immigrants in Europe but by asking what 
Europeans do when they are working abroad – I think it quickly becomes 
apparent that most human beings respond in much the same way when 
they find themselves in an unfamiliar place. 
In the latter half of the 20th century there was an ironic reversal of 
this process. European governments, often with good intentions, 
responded to the presence of immigrant communities by providing 
support for what they saw as the most ‘authentic’ elements of their 
cultures. These policies – let us admit it – frequently had retrograde and 
damaging effects: the state’s money and support went to the most 
‘traditional’ – which were also often the most hidebound – sections of 
migrant communities. The secularists and progressives were either 
ignored or treated as if they were irrelevant.
The problem lies perhaps in squeezing the lived reality of life into 
rigid frames like ‘culture’, ‘tradition’, ‘religion’ and so on. Instead of 
thinking of ‘culture’, why don’t we think about everyday practices – 
what people actually do? Why don’t we think about the ways they spend 
their time; what they like to eat; what sort of music they listen to? When 
we think about questions like these, an odd thing happens. We find that 
migrants and their hosts are not so different after all; neither of them 
are stuck within their ‘cultures’. Both have evolved, unwittingly or not, 
towards each other. We find that Holland is a country of soccer-playing 
rijsttafel eaters who are famous for growing a Turkish flower – the tulip; 
we find that Britain is a land of cricket-playing, korma-eating reggae 
singers; Germany becomes a land of döner kebab and Eurovision and 
skateboarders. Why then should states support mosques and temples 
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rather than football clubs and dance troupes and art exhibitions? 
But the issue of migration takes on a completely different aspect at 
the edges of the European confluence – that is to say in Southern Spain, 
and especially in Greece. As I see it, the violence that is being visited on 
immigrants in Greece today is just as critical a test for Europe as is the 
collapse of that country’s economy. Greece is sometimes looked upon as 
an exception. But in my view Greece is not a laggard but an outlier – it is 
a country that sometimes provides glimpses of things to come. When 
riots broke out in Greece in 2008 they seemed inexplicable. But in 
retrospect it is clear that they were the first signs of a wave of unrest 
that the currents of the Mediterranean would soon carry to Tunisia, 
Egypt, Israel, Spain, and even beyond to England and the United States. 
This is why Greece is so important: if the ascendancy of the fascist, anti-
immigrant right continues its rise in that country, it will have profound 
consequences for all of Europe. These developments will spread beyond 
Greece, and the violence that is now being inflicted upon Africans and 
Asians will soon be turned against other Europeans. 
One thing we can be sure of is that the pressures of migration are 
only going to intensify in the years ahead, not just in Europe but around 
the world. This is because the numbers of people displaced by climate 
change is going to grow very fast.2 It is essential for Europe to take the 
lead in creating a template that can be used everywhere for dealing 
with the mounting crises of displacement that will arise from 
accelerating disruptions of our planetary environment.
III
From confluence to crossroads: I come now to a fork in the road that 
confronts not just Europe but the Earth itself.3 Let me put it briefly: the 
resources of this planet, which we all inhabit, are dwindling very fast, 
while its atmosphere and climate are changing in ways that may bring 
2 For more on this, see Campbell et al. 2007. 
3 I am echoing the phrasing of climate scientist James Hansen (2009, loc. 2202): “humanity has 
reached a fork in the road.” 
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an end to civilisation as we know it.4 There is now an almost-universal 
consensus amongst scientists that very significant environmental 
change lies ahead, for the planet as a whole. 
The United States is by far the world’s most powerful and important 
nation. It is also the nation that has contributed the most to our 
knowledge of climate change. What is more, the US has already begun 
to feel the effects of climate change: large parts of the country are now 
in a condition of permanent drought, forests are dying in the mountains, 
and many regions have been hit by severe floods. Australia is similarly 
suffering the effects of an extended drought.5 For all these reasons, the 
US and Australia should, by right, be taking the lead in addressing 
climate change. But instead of an awakening, what we see in the US is a 
determined, well-orchestrated effort to suppress public awareness of 
climate change. At a time when a sense of the collective interest, and 
the public good, is more necessary than ever before, these concepts 
seem to have lost all meaning in the world’s most important country.6 
The same is true of Australia, which is perhaps even more reckless in its 
approach to these issues.7
Where else then are we to look for leadership on this issue. Could it 
perhaps come from newly-emergent nations like India, China, Russia, 
Brazil, and South Africa? These countries certainly have the most to lose 
in the sense that they have the highest at-risk populations. Yet to hope 
that they will take the lead on this issue is unrealistic, and in a sense, 
unfair. The emergent powers are all striving to raise the living standards 
of their own people; and they are all motivated, to a greater or lesser 
4 See Kolbert 2006, Chapter 10: “It may seem impossible to imagine that a technologically 
advanced society could choose, in essence, to destroy itself, but that is what we are now in the 
process of doing.” 
5 McKibben 2010, 5, 60. 
6 Elizabeth Kolbert (2006, Chapter 8) writes: “the United States, having failed to defeat Kyoto, 
may be in the process of doing something even more damaging: ruining the chances of 
reaching a post-Kyoto agreement.” This judgement was proved correct at Copenhagen.  
7 For Australia’s resistance to the Kyoto Protocol, see Flannery 2006, 226-227. 
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degree, by a desire to ‘catch up’ with the West, in all things, including 
carbon emissions.8 Even though two of them are already among the 
world’s top three polluters, it is still true that at this point in time, their 
per capita contribution to the net stock of carbon in the atmosphere is 
small.9  
The rapid increase of emissions from these countries thus has a dual 
aspect: in one sense it represents a new level of intensification in the 
globe’s collective rush towards disaster.10 But in another sense, it is also 
a challenge, a clear declaration that if there is to be any cutting back, if 
sacrifices are to be made, then they must come, in the first instance, 
from the West, which has gobbled up far more than its fair share of the 
world’s resources. In other words, the emergent countries have taken 
the stand that history has absolved them of taking the lead in this 
matter: they are rather looking to be led – not by coercion, but by 
example. 
Where can this leadership come from? This sorry process of 
elimination leaves us with only one possibility: Europe. Here are the 
reasons why: Firstly, if there was ever a transnational issue then it is 
climate change – the weather has no respect for national boundaries 
and borders.11 Yet in the face of this dire crisis, many nations, especially 
8 Tim Flannery (2006, 306) discusses this issue at some length.
9 These arguments have been recognised as well-founded by European nations (although not 
the US and Australia). Cf. Kolbert 2006, Chapter 8: “Pieter van Geel, the Dutch environment 
secretary, described the European outlook to me as follows: ‘We cannot say, ‘Well, we have our 
wealth, based on the use of fossil fuels for the last three hundred years, and, now that your 
countries are growing, you may not grow at this rate, because we have a climate change 
problem.”’ 
10 James Hansen (2009, loc. 3302) provides a damning list of all the ways in which the US is 
moving backwards on the carbon emissions issue.
11 See, for example, Burke/Mabey 2006: “The biggest global problems that will dominate the 21st 
century, from terrorism to climate change, from mass migration to organized crime, cannot be 
solved by nations acting alone. They require a pooling of sovereignty. Europe is the world’s most 
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the larger and most powerful ones, are pursuing their national interests 
ever more aggressively. Nationalism is indeed one of the most pernicious 
threads in the helix of disaster. Europe, where nationalism was born, 
and which has endured its worst excesses, is the only part of the world 
that has succeeded in articulating and acting upon a vision of political 
organisation that goes beyond the nation-state. 
Secondly, experience shows us that if climate change is to be tackled 
effectively then it will require stringent regulation and oversight by 
national and transnational bodies. That the issue has burst upon us at 
a time when much of the world is in thrall to an ideology of laissez-faire 
is but another aspect of the catastrophic convergence that we are now 
faced with. In this too Europe is an exception: the public good continues 
to be a cherished ideal, and regulatory oversight is accepted to be one of 
the most important functions of government. This perhaps is why 
corporations have not been able to create an industry of climate denial 
in Europe. As a result the European public is far better informed about 
climate change than people elsewhere.
Thirdly, climate change cannot be addressed without a historical 
reckoning. To move ahead will require a massive change of expectations 
amongst people. Unfortunately, in most countries around the world, this 
is, politically speaking, an impossible message to communicate. Here 
again Europe, with its highly educated populations, holds the only 
possibility of hope, although even here, it will not be easy to educate 
people into a realistic awareness of what lies ahead – but this is one 
place where it could succeed and if it does it will set an example for the 
world.12 
sustained and far-reaching experiment in the practical and political realities of sharing 
sovereignty.”
12 The European Union’s documents on climate change, such as Climate Change and 
International Security and Europe in the World are salutary in their realistic approach to the 
issues, and also in that they do not envisage planning for climate change as a principally military 
exercise. 
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Finally, and perhaps most importantly, Europe is equipped to lead on 
this issue because it is the one part of the world that has already 
undertaken large-scale preparations for climate change. No country is a 
better example of this than Holland. 
The project of Europe has been flawed in many ways: it was 
excessively bureaucratic; it placed the interests of business above those 
of people; it was half-hearted in some respects and over-reached in 
others. Its most important failure perhaps was an imaginative one: the 
leaders who founded the European Union forgot that people need stories 
to live by. The old story – that of European nationalism – had two hundred 
years of story-telling behind it; that is why it had such a grip on people’s 
imaginations. The new Europe has yet to find its story – and politicians 
and leaders will never be able to give it that story. This story can only 
come from writers, dreamers, and thinkers – and it has yet to be told. 
Through most of the journey that has brought the world to this fork 
in the road, Europe has led the way. In doing so, it has created an 
immense continent of carbon in the atmosphere, a dark shadow wholly 
out of proportion to its size. Now that we have arrived at this turn in the 
road it is clear that what lies ahead is not a fork but an unbridgeable, 
steadily-growing chasm. We can only hope that Europe will now take 
the lead once again, in showing us how best to turn back. 
Amitav Ghosh is an Indian author, whose work has been translated into more 
than two dozen languages. He published his first novel, The Circle of Reason 
in 1986, and his second, The Shadow Lines, in 1988. Since then, Ghosh 
has written a number of books, including The Glass Palace, which won the 
International e-Book Award at the Frankfurt book fair in 2001. Sea of Poppies 
was shortlisted for the Man Booker Prize, and was awarded the Crossword Book 
Prize and the IndiaPlaza Golden Quill Award in 2008. Most recently, he has 
published River of Smoke (2011), which is the second volume of a projected 
series of novels, The Ibis Trilogy. Ghosh has also published in journals and 
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Vladimir & Vuk Palibrk
In this final chapter of the Osvald-saga, 
we find out how Osvald meets his 
demise.











The key role of culture 
in building Europe 
could not be more urgent.
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An Afterword
The last four years (2009-2012) have been only the most recent 
chapter in an almost 60-year journey for ECF, a journey that continues. 
While one thematic focus may have drawn to a close, it has set the 
course for the next – so neither an end nor a beginning, but a step along 
the way. Throughout our history, our vision has been of an open, 
democratic, and inclusive Europe in which culture is a key contributor. 
Reflecting back over 60 years, one could say that this vision was and is a 
timeless one, critical at any given moment. This is true; however, we do 
believe that now, when Europe’s confidence is shaken and it is facing 
perhaps the most severe assault on its identity, both internally and 
externally, the key role of culture in building Europe could not be more 
urgent.
We considered the word narrative as a word in motion – moving in 
space and in time, connecting what is and has been with what could be; 
like Europe, a work in progress, mired in questions and perhaps confusion 
– while momentarily stalled, not in the least stagnated. Narratives are 
journeys, and ECF’s work has been to trace some of these journeys, to 
follow their twists and turns, their intersections, convergences, and 
confluences. The individual lines traced form the intricate web that is 
Europe.
We looked to the grass roots, to the edges, the peripheries – of 
European communities and the continent; at views from both the ‘inside’ 
and beyond Europe. And we see now that we need to do more of this – 
supporting the grass roots, connecting the centres with the peripheries, 
and reflecting on Europe’s place in the world.
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As Milla Mineva remarks within these pages: “Today more than 
twenty years later, liberal democracy is in crisis, although we prefer to 
discuss economic policies rather than the withdrawal of citizens from 
the institutions of democratic democracy.”
This is the case. However, although we have witnessed a growing gap 
between people, democratic processes, and structures (hence the need 
for new narratives), ECF has also seen and supported hundreds of 
organisations which show that culture is an invaluable tool for engaging 
people in the future of their communities – and, indeed, the future of 
Europe and the world.
We have seen strengths locally, heard voices that are not only reacting 
to crisis but also finding new ways of acting – European change-makers 
who are living a new narrative for Europe. But this is a narrative that is 
outside of the institutional narratives. We have also seen a fresh new 
approach to Europe and to European narratives, as cultural organisations 
work comfortably and keenly with other sectors on common causes. 
New art forms mix and remix our narratives in ways that allow 
multiple perspectives on our pasts and stimulate shared participation in 
our future. New forms of communication use the image to vault over 
language barriers. Witness European Souvenirs, a collaborative artwork 
premiered in Amsterdam during Imagining Europe (6 October 2012), which 
saw five artists from Spain, Poland, Turkey, the Netherlands, and the UK 
embark on voyages of discovery through personal and public archives to 
unearth, expose, question, and remix memories of migration. Their 
personal collections then converged in a live cinema event – a 
conversation in real time that wove together the threads of their 
particular quests. The audience experienced a rich improvisation 
layering, juxtaposing and remixing sound and image.1 
1 For more on the European Souvenirs project, see www.europeansouvenirs.eu.  
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Remixing is a continuing, open, and participatory process. The 
remixed products are openly shared and others are invited and 
encouraged to participate in the process to rewrite context and content, 
helping us to connect with past and present narratives – and imagine 
future ones. This is truly the building of new narratives, both in method 
and in results – and why European Souvenirs is so compelling. Even though 
it is a performance and therefore a ‘product’ or an artwork, it is also an 
invitation to reflect on our own memories, to contribute them to the 
remixing oeuvre and to a much-needed intergenerational exchange. 
Our strategy for 2013-2016 will be to connect local change-makers 
and help them scale up their actions. In so doing, we will facilitate an 
enabling environment to make the local European. These connected 
local actors will present an active remapping of Europe – reclaiming the 
lost public arena and reinvigorating democracy.
ECF’s challenge will be to help build the bridge between those who 
are reinventing democracy, repossessing the public space, and our 
democratic institutions which are presently so disconnected from 
European citizens. Along the way we will need to find the means to 
illuminate this work, and so engage a wider European public and also 
policy-makers; to bridge the gap or open up some ‘connecting passages’ 
(a phrase Svetla Kazalarska uses here) between citizens and institutions 
so that the necessary changes can be made, and Europe can move 
forward firmly rooted in European people and cultures.








The Making of 
European Narratives
So how far are we in the story? 
Are we dangling close to the 
cli hanger? Are we Icarus or are we 
Don Quixote? Are we as desperate and 
heartbroken as Hamlet or are we more 
like a Dante shu  ing through the 
underworld towards the light?
